Pippa Norris's Weblog

Muslim integration into Western cultures

In 2005, the International Organization for Migration estimates that among all world regions, Europe hosted the highest number of international migrants (70.5 million). At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the OECD estimates that about one in four or five residents were foreign-born in countries such as Australia (24%), Switzerland (24%), New Zealand (19%), and Canada (18%), as were one in eight in Germany (13%), the United States (13%), and Sweden (12%) OECD 2008).  Due to these developments, European countries which used to be relatively homogeneous in their cultural heritage, historical traditions, ethnic composition, language, lifestyles, and religious faith -- such as Denmark, France, and Sweden -- have become far more socially diverse today

Population flows are diverse. The rapid settlement of Muslim migrants into European societies, in particular, has raised important challenges for how European policymakers manage cultural diversity, maintain social cohesion, and accommodate minorities. This is one of the main reasons for the contemporary strength of anti-immigrant parties, as demonstrated by Marie Le Pen winning 18 percent of the vote for the Front Nationale in the first round of the French presidential elections, on a platform denouncing "Islamification.” The backlash against migration has shaped party politics in many European nations, in countries as diverse as the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway and Sweden. More broadly, concern over Muslim migrants has been heightened by a series of extreme terrorist events attracting global headlines, particularly by 9/11 in the United States, the bombings directed against civilian targets in Madrid (2004), London (2005), and Mumbai (2008).

These events highlight the importance of understanding the process of assimilation, and in particular, how far do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new setting? Answers to these questions not only have important political implications; they also help us understand theoretical debates about whether basic cultural values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or attributes of a given society.  Theories of cultural integration suggest that immigrants gradually absorb the values and norms which predominate in their host society, especially on an inter-generational basis. By contrast, theories of divergence suggest that distinctive social values and norms are enduring and deep-rooted within each nation, shaped by collective histories, common languages, and religious traditions, so that migrant populations are unlikely to abandon their cultural roots when they settle in another country. These claims can be tested empirically by examining whether the basic values of Muslim migrants are closer to those prevailing in their societies of origin or destination.

Evidence can be compared using evidence the five pooled waves of the World Values Survey and European Values Study, a global investigation of socio-cultural and political change from 1981 to 2007. The survey includes systematic data on public opinion in affluent post-industrial societies and in many diverse Islamic states containing Muslim-plurality populations, providing the broadest comparison available from any existing social survey. Societies in the World Values Survey can be classified by their predominant religion. The World Values Survey includes Arab states, both majority Sunni (such as Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt) and majority Shi’a (such as Iran and Iraq), as well as countries in Asia (Azerbaijan, Kyrgystan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia), Central Europe (Bosnia Herzegovina, Albania) and in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso). This allows us to compare the attitudes of three groups: Muslims living in Muslim-predominant societies (termed Societies of Origin), Westerners living in Western societies (termed Societies of Destination), and Muslim migrants living in Western societies.

A series of 13 items were selected and developed into standardized 0 to 100-point scales to monitor cultural values towards gender equality, sexuality, religiosity, and democratic values. Comparisons were drawn among these three social groups, as shown in figure 1. It is apparent that Muslim migrants are consistently located on average in the middle of the value scales, being less conservative than Muslims living in Muslim Societies of Origin, but also less liberal than Westerners living in Western societies. In other words, the position of Muslim migrants proved to be located approximately half-way between the dominant values prevailing within their Destination and their Origins. It is also striking that although much of the European debate has focused on the attitudes and practices towards the roles of men and women, it appears that on the gender equality scale, Muslim minorities are in fact far closer to Western than to Islamic publics.

 

When analyzing the evidence, however, several controls need to be introduced for factors which typically influence social attitudes, such as education, age and sex. After all, Muslim migrants may well prove distinctive from their compatriots for many reasons; for example, younger groups, and those with greater educational qualifications or higher socioeconomic resources, may well find it easier to relocate. Hierarchical linear models (HLM) are most appropriate for this sort of analysis, including multilevel regression analysis. The results confirm that Muslim migrants living in Western societies are located roughly in the center of the cultural spectrum, located between the publics living in Islamic and Western societies. It is entirely possible—indeed, we think it rather likely—that some degree of self-selection may be involved:  those who choose to immigrate to the U.S. or to Spain may already have values that are relatively compatible with those of their future host country.  But even if this is true, these findings contradict the idea that immigrants simply import an unmodified version of the values of their own country into their new host country.  In the long-term, the basic cultural values of migrants appear to change in conformity with the predominant culture of each society. 

Details are forthcoming in Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2012. “Muslim integration into Western cultures: Between Origins and Destimations.” Political Studies 

Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and also ARC Fellow and Professor of Government at the University of Sydney. Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu

Ronald Inglehart is Professor of Political Science in the Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan and also Director, Laboratory for Comparative Social Research, Higher School of Economics Moscow and St. Petersburg. ringlehart@gmail.com

Regime change and the ‘Arab spring’

The Arab spring has been marked by the revolutionary downfall and removal of autocratic leaders in Tunisia (President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali), Egypt (President Hosni Mubarrak), and Libya (President Momar Gaddafi). Major protests, strikes, and demonstrations have occurred throughout the region, destabilizing regimes in Syria and Yemen. Stirrings of popular unrest during the 'Arab spring' have renewed debate about the regimes most likely to replace traditional autocracies in the region. These events have encouraged many commentators to hope that the Middle East and North Africa is experiencing the gradual transition from autocracy to secular democracies, where moderate Islamic parties, new constitutions, and elected governments gradually expand human rights, including religious freedoms, pluralism, and tolerance of diverse faiths. Preliminary results from the October elections in Tunisia suggest victory for the moderate Islamic party Ennahda. Yet it remains unclear whether the outcome will be similar for moderate forces in Egypt and Libya. Contemporary events remain in continuous flux, the final outcome of these developments are far from settled, and other commentators fear that the instability caused by the popular uprisings will allow openings for conservative and more extremist religious forces to come to power, enforcing stricter interpretation of Islamic law.

Do Muslim publics want secular democracies, characterized by religious pluralism, separation of religious and government authorities, tolerance of diverse religious beliefs and practices, moderate parties, and constitutions where no single type of faith is privileged, following the Turkish model? Or do they prefer regimes where constitutions reflect Islamic principles, spiritual authorities predominate in politics, conservative Islamic parties prevail, and religious courts enforce Sharia law, reflecting the Iranian model? Or, alternatively, do many Muslim publics fall somewhere between these two poles?

Many factors will probably determine the final type of constitutional settlements and the regimes which develop in the countries in the Arab region which are currently experiencing challenges to autocracy. The new settlements will be shaped by historical traditions, the type of political elite, levels of economic development, the power and role of the armed forces, and external pressures from the international community, among many other factors. But preferences in the mass culture are also likely to play a role in any constitutional settlement, especially where these are subject to popular referendum, as in Tunisia. It is therefore important to determine whether the general public in Muslim-plurality nations favors the Turkish model of secular democracy, the Iranian model of religious autocracy, or another type of constitutional settlement located between these poles.

Regimes can be classified using a four-fold typology which distinguishes preferences for liberal democracy (on the horizontal axis) and preferences for secular states, defined here as those favoring high levels of religious pluralism and freedom, on the vertical axis. Comparison of Muslim-plurality societies suggest that they are governed today by diverse types of regimes, which can be illustrated by the contrasts among Mali (exemplifying a secular democracy), Chad (classified as a secular autocracy), and Tunisia (as a religious autocracy).

	Low << Liberal democracy >> High
Low << Religious pluralism >> High	Secular autocracy	Secular democracy
	Religious autocracy	Religious democracy

 

Public preferences for each type of regime

 

What type of regime do Muslims publics prefer? The World Values Survey 1999-2007 provides data in a wide variety of societies to examine the distribution of public opinion towards secularism and democracy.

 

Preferences for a secular state are measured by two items: "How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?(i) Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections; (ii) Religious leaders should not influence government decisions."

 

Support for democratic principles is measured by the question: "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (i) Having a democratic political system. (ii) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; (iii) Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country; (iv) Having the army rule."

 

Figure 1: Public preferences for regimes

 

 

The results of the comparison in Figure 1 shows that the publics in Muslim-majority societies displayed diverse preferences; hence people living in some countries, such as Tanzania and Morocco, favored secular democracy, while others such as Albania and Indonesia proved slightly less supportive of democracy although equally secular, and still others, such as Algeria, favored religious autocracy. Overall, therefore, although some assume commonality, the contrasts among Muslim-plurality societies stand out.

Source: More details can be found in Pippa Norris. 2011. 'Muslim support for secular democracy'. www.pippanorris.com

Lack of women at Westminster

Now that the dust has settled after the May 2010 general election, and the outcome for women is clear, there are many reasons for disappointment.

Four women sit in the new cabinet (14%), led by Theresa May as Home Secretary, while Caroline Spelman is the new environment secretary, Cheryl Gillan is the Welsh secretary, and Baroness Warsi is minister without portfolio. The British cabinet lags far behind many European countries; Spain has 53% women in its Cabinet, while Germany has 37% and France 33%.

Overall 142 female MPs were elected to Westminster (21.8%) – more than one in five of the total members in the House of Commons. This was another steady increase, up from 128 or 19.8% of all members in 2005 – but only a modest gain. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union figures, after the election Britain ranks 55^th worldwide in the proportion of women in the lower house of parliament, lagging far behind the familiar litany of global leaders such as Sweden, Norway and Finland, as well as European democracies such as Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands. Despite the gains in numbers at Westminster, in fact Britain's international ranking slipped 10 places since 2005, because other countries – including many newer democracies – are advancing at a faster pace.

Labour continues to have the best record of the major parties, now with 81 women MPs (almost one third or 31%). The Conservatives made substantial seat gains, including those contested by women candidates, but still elected only 48 women MPs (15.7%). Meanwhile, despite all the egalitarian rhetoric, the Liberal Democrats actually managed to fall back to just 7 female MPs (12%), and they haven't nominated any for their five Cabinet posts.

	Conservative		Labour		Liberal Democrat		Total in all parties (*)
	PPC	MPs	PPC	MPs	PPC	MPs	N. of all MPs	% of all MPs
1979	31	13	52	11	52	0	19	3.0
1983	40	13	78	10	75	0	23	3.5
1987	46	17	92	21	106	2	41	6.3
1992	63	20	138	37	143	2	60	9.2
1997	69	13	157	101	140	3	120	18.2
2001	92	14	146	94	135	5	118	17.9
2005	118	17	166	97	142	10	128	19.8
2010	149	48	191	81	134	7	142 (*)	21.8

(*) Including all other UK parties (in 2010, the Greens, SNP, SF, SDLP, Alliance and Independent each elected one women MP.)

In a sense, this is all water under the bridge. But there are still important issues which need to be addressed.

In particular, right now only two candidates have declared themselves for the Labour party leadership contest – the bros David and Ed Miliband. Both have considerable potential as the next generation of rising Labour leaders. But where are the women? Harriet Harman, the Deputy leader of the Labour party, would have been an obvious contender, but she has quite firmly refused to stand. Other names which have been mooted in this context include Tessa Jowell, Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood), and Emily Thornberry (Islington South & Finsbury).

Ed Miliband, who is a personable candidate but without deep experience of high office, stood in part due to a grassroots web campaign among supporters.

If you could encourage any of the Labour women MPs to stand in the leadership contest, who would this be??

 

The electoral politics of the Liberal-Conservative Coalition Government

Coalition politics is a familiar process in most European countries. There are no guarantees of the final results, as polling day can bring many unexpected outcomes, sometimes generating month-long negotiations requiring grand coalitions of parties drawn from across the political spectrum in order to cobble together a government. Nevertheless during the election campaign, European parties often signal their willingness to collaborate with potential coalition partners, and which parties are outside this process, providing voters with clues about the eventual outcome.

In the United Kingdom, however, the British government coalition joining the fate of the Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties, announced yesterday in the Rose Garden of No 10, seems to have been utterly serendipitous for all concerned, even to commentators, pundits and the party leaders involved at the heart of this process. The outcome, the first governing coalition in Britain since the end of World War II, and the first ever Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition in history, was unexpected despite the long series of public opinion polls predicting a hung parliament. It was agreed by the party leaders only during the five days of negotiations following the election, after it became apparent that the Conservatives were the largest party at Westminster but without an overall parliamentary majority.

Why the surprise?

In terms of ideological and policy positions, for a decade the Liberal Democrats and the Labour party have always been closer; indeed in the 2001 and 2005 elections, the Comparative Manifesto Project estimated that the Liberal Democrat manifesto was more progressive and slightly to the left of the Labour party platform, especially on issues of taxation and proposed levels of social welfare spending. By contrast, although the Conservatives have moved closer to the center of the British political spectrum under the leadership of David Cameron, nevertheless they remained further to the right of their other main rivals. And on certain issues, notably Europe, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives remain miles apart.

But how are the parties placed by voters? Did the coalition, and the decision by Nick Clegg to join with the Conservatives rather than Labour, reflect the outcome that the British public wanted? During election night, Paddy Ashdown famously said that the people have spoken, but we still don't know what they have said. One problem was that the main exit polls, commissioned by all the major media organizations, failed to ask any questions beyond voting. So the coalition has generated a mountain of speculations offered by all sides but no systematic evidence. Those reading the tea-leaves often claimed that the British public 'wanted' a hung parliament but, in fact, this cannot be deduced from the outcome. Each citizen cast a particular vote in their specific constituency, but the final outcome was the collective result of millions of independent decisions.

One way we can throw light on this question is to turn to the 2010 British Election Study (BES) which has just been released. The BES data provides some revealing clues about what the electorate actually preferred. And in particular the results tell us something important about the second choice of Liberal Democrat voters. If the decision about entering a coalition with either Labour or the Conservatives were in the hands of Liberal Democrat voters, what would they have wanted?

The table below, drawn from the BES campaign panel survey among 1,355 respondents, reports how people voted on May 6^th and also reveals their second choice preference among those who voted but who really preferred another party. Among those in this group who cast a ballot for the Liberal Democrats, only 12% opted for the Conservative party as their second choice preference. By contrast, almost half the Liberal Democrat voters (48%) chose Labour as their second preference. Likewise, the Liberal Democrats were the 2^nd choice preference of four out of ten Labour voters.

In other words, it is not simply that the Labour and the Liberal Democrats parties are far closer in their manifesto policies and ideological values, but Liberal Democrat and Labour voters also recognized the close affinity in their willingness to switch votes. The Conservative party was in a far different position, where UKIP (to the right of the party) were their largest 2^nd choice party.

Thus the new coalition governing British politics has clearly shaken up the old pattern of British party politics. Whether the decision of the leaders will cause Liberal Democrat voters to move gradually closer towards the Conservatives in their electoral sympathies, or whether instead the Liberal Democratic party will eventually be punished by their supporters for entering this alliance, remains a fascinating question which only time will tell.

	How people voted on May 6th 2010
Among those who preferred another party	Conservative voter	Labour voter	Lib-Dem voter
Con 2nd choice	13	2	12
Lab 2nd choice	4	22	48
Lib-Dem 2nd choice	21	43	15
SNP 2nd choice	1	4	3
PC 2nd choice	0	2	1
UKIP 2nd choice	41	8	4
BNP 2nd choice	10	6	1
Green 2nd choice	2	9	11
Other 2nd choice	10	6	6
	100	100	100

Source: British Election Study 2010 Campaign Panel. F/w YouGov. N. 1,355

A watershed break in UK politics and prospects for electoral reform

It is now official; after the May 6^th 2010 general election, and five days of detailed negotiations, the UK now has a Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition government. The key aspects of the deal include the Liberal Democrat leader, Nick Clegg, as Deputy Prime Minister, four more Liberal Democrat MPs with Ministerial posts in the new Cabinet, and broad agreement on a range of policy areas. This is the first coalition government in Britain in sixty-five years.

Does this represent a historic water-shed transformation of the British political system? Clearly the sign of two leaders standing shoulder-to-shoulder at the first press conference in the No 10 Rose Garden symbolizes a change in how things are usually done in British government. The leadership love-fest all looks very kumbaya. Skeptics point out, however, that there are serious challenges facing the new arrangement, not least the difficulties facing the British economy, with record levels of unemployment and a massive deficit which needs addressing. In foreign policy, there is Afghanistan. The parties are unexpected bedfellows, not least because the Lib Dems are far more progressive than the Labour party, and on numerous issues their election platform was diametrically opposed to Conservative policies, not least on the EU. It is unclear whether the coalition can last, even for the five years of government.

But will the new politics be a temporary arrangement, a short-term marriage of convenience arising unexpectedly from the close election result, or a longer-term decisive break with one-party majoritarian government?

The key issue determining this issue will be the pledge on electoral reform. The agreement between the parties is a pledge for a referendum on the Alternative Vote, where the MPs will be free to campaign for or against this issue. Now the real tragedy here is that the referendum should have been called for whether there should be any electoral reform. Period. As in New Zealand. Deciding in advance that there can only be one system on the table for debate will divide the reform camp, will limit the options which should be under debate, and which, if passed, will still not produce a more proportional electoral system. The fact is that the Alternative Vote is a majoritarian system; it maintains single member districts and requires any candidate to achieve a majority of votes to be elected. Voters express preferential votes, ranking parties in priority. If no candidates achieve 50% of the vote in the constituency, then the 2^nd choice preferences from the candidate with the smallest share of the vote are redistributed until one candidate does achieve a simple majority. This is equivalent to the 2^nd Ballot or runoff election, but without the need for two successive elections. Will this benefit small parties? Those in the center, such as the Lib Dems, are often the 2^nd choice party for many supporters of the major party. As such the LibDems will probably benefit from 2^nd choice redistributions. BUT they will still discriminate against smaller parties with geographically dispersed support, such as the Greens and the BNP.

It is unclear whether the public would vote 'yes' in favor of abandoning First-Past-the-Post (Single Member Plurality) system. The polls cannot be trusted since British public opinion currently remains soft on this issue and the answers are highly dependent upon the way that the question is framed. But the public has become more familiar with many other types of electoral system in the UK – whether the AMS system in Scotland and Wales, PR list in European elections, and other systems used in Northern Ireland and London contests. There may be enough of a plurality to favor getting rid of the transparent unfairness of the old system. Does this mean that the British public would favor AV? That is far less clear indeed. Breaking up the referendum question into two (do we want to change? If so, which system do you favor) would have been far wiser.

Nevertheless if passed – and this is a big if – AV would institutionalize coalition power-sharing agreements at Westminster. We would be back to the form of politics which was more characteristic of the inter-war era. Its been a long time coming. The British electorate has been shifting away from two party politics since the early 1970s. Despite this, British institutions and FPTP have frozen the old Labour and Conservative oligarchy in place at Westminster for decades. Now, at last, it appears as though party politics at Westminster may -- at last -- be catching up with the public.

UK British general election 6th May 2010: Summary of results

UK General Election 6^th May 2010

 

 

 

The following provides a brief summary of the results of the UK general election held on 6th May 2010. Access to the 2010 constituency results data in Excel and PASW/SPSS formats is now available for downloading from my website wwwpippanorris.com under 'data'.

 

Contents

 

Table 1: UK scoreboard    2

Table 2: % Share of the popular vote (UK)    3

Figure 1: % Share of the popular vote (UK)    4

Table 3: % Share of seats (UK)    5

Figure 2: % Share of seats (UK) 1900-2010    6

Figure 3: Government Votes: Seats Ratio 1945-2010    7

Table 4: Government overall majority, 1900-2010    8

Figure 4: UK Electoral Turnout 1832-2010    9

Figure 5: Electoral system effects    10

Figure 6: May 6^th 2010 UK Election map    11

 

 

Table 1: UK scoreboard

Party	Seats	Gain	Loss	Net	Votes	%	+/-%
Conservative	306	100	3	+97	10,706,647	36.1	+3.8
Labour	258	3	94	-91	8,604,358	29.0	-6.2
Liberal Democrat	57	8	13	-5	6,827,938	23.0	+1.0
Democratic Unionist Party	8	0	1	-1	168,216	0.6	-0.3
Scottish National Party	6	0	0	0	491,386	1.7	+0.1
Sinn Fein	5	0	0	0	171,942	0.6	-0.1
Plaid Cymru	3	1	0	+1	165,394	0.6	-0.1
Social Democratic & Labour Party	3	0	0	0	110,970	0.4	-0.1
Green	1	1	0	+1	285,616	1.0	-0.1
Alliance Party	1	1	0	+1	42,762	0.1	+0.0
UK Independence Party	0	0	0	0	917,832	3.1	+0.9
British National Party	0	0	0	0	563,743	1.9	+1.2
Ulster Conservatives and Unionists - New Force	0	0	1	-1	102,361	0.3	-0.1
English Democrats	0	0	0	0	64,826	0.2	+0.2
Respect-Unity Coalition	0	0	1	-1	33,251	0.1	-0.1
Traditional Unionist Voice	0	0	0	0	26,300	0.1
Christian Party	0	0	0	0	18,623	0.1
Independent Community and Health Concern	0	0	1	-1	16,150	0.1	+0.0
Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition	0	0	0	0	12,275	0.0
Scottish Socialist Party	0	0	0	0	3,157	0.0	-0.1
Others	1	1	1	0	319,891	1.1	0.0
Turnout					29,653,638	65.1	4.0

Note: After 649 of 650 seats declared.

Source: news.BBC.co.uk

 

Table 2: % Share of the popular vote (UK)

	Con	Lab	LD	Other
1900	50.3	1.3	45.0	2.5
1906	43.4	4.8	49.4
1910	46.8	7.0	43.5
1910	46.6	6.4	44.2
1918	38.7	20.8	25.6
1922	38.5	29.7	28.8
1923	38.0	30.7	29.7
1924	46.8	33.3	17.8
1929	38.1	37.1	23.5
1931	60.7	30.9	7.0
1935	53.3	38.0	6.7
1945	39.6	48.0	9.0	2.6
1950	43.4	46.1	9.1	1.0
1951	48.0	48.8	2.6	0.3
1955	49.7	46.4	2.7	0.7
1959	49.4	43.8	5.9	0.7
1964	43.4	44.1	11.2	0.9
1966	41.9	48.0	8.6	1.3
1970	46.4	43.1	7.5	2.3
1974	37.9	37.2	19.3	3.5
1974	35.8	39.2	18.3	4.4
1979	43.9	36.9	13.8	3.3
1983	42.4	27.6	25.4	2.2
1987	42.3	30.8	22.5	2.2
1992	41.9	34.4	17.8	3.7
1997	30.7	43.3	16.8	7.1
2001	31.7	40.7	18.3	9.3
2005	32.3	35.2	22.0	10.5
2010	36.1	29.0	23.0	11.9
Change 2005-10	+3.8	-6.2	+1.0	+1.4

Source: Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. British Electoral Facts 1832-1999 Ashgate; updated

Figure 1: % Share of the popular vote (UK)

Source: Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. British Electoral Facts 1832-1999 Ashgate; updated.

Table 3: % Share of seats (UK)

	Con	Lab	LD	Other	Total
1900	402	2	183	83	670
1906	156	29	399	86	670
1910	272	40	274	84	670
1910	271	42	272	85	670
1918	382	57	163	105	707
1922	344	142	115	14	615
1923	258	191	158	8	615
1924	412	151	40	12	615
1929	260	287	59	9	615
1931	522	52	36	5	615
1935	429	154	21	11	615
1945	210	393	12	25	640
1950	298	315	9	3	625
1951	321	295	6	3	625
1955	345	277	6	2	630
1959	365	258	6	1	630
1964	304	317	9	0	630
1966	253	364	12	1	630
1970	330	288	6	6	630
1974	297	301	14	23	635
1974	277	319	13	26	635
1979	339	269	11	16	635
1983	397	209	23	21	650
1987	376	229	22	23	650
1992	336	271	20	24	651
1997	165	418	46	30	659
2001	166	412	52	29	659
2005	197	355	62	32	646
2010	306	258	57	28	649
Change	97	-91	-5	-4

Source: Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. British Electoral Facts 1832-1999 Ashgate; updated.

 

Figure 2: % Share of seats (UK) 1900-2010

 

 

Source: Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. British Electoral Facts 1832-1999 Ashgate; updated.

 

Figure 3: Government Votes: Seats Ratio 1945-2010

 

 

Note: Calculated by % votes/% seats for the governing party. 2010 is estimated based on the assumption of a Conservative government

Table 4: Government overall majority, 1900-2010

	Overall Maj	Govnt
1900	135	Con	Salisbury/Balfour
1906	129	Lib	Campbell Bannerman
1910		None	Asquith
1910		None	Asquith
1918	283	Coalition	Lloyd George
1922	74	Con	Bonar Law
1923		None	Baldwin
1924	210	Con	MacDonald
1929		None	MacDonald
1931	492	Nat	MacDonald
1935	242	Nat	Baldwin/Chamberlain/Churchill
1945	147	Lab	Attlee
1950	6	Lab	Attlee
1951	16	Con	Churchill
1955	59	Con	Eden/Macmillan
1959	99	Con	Macmillan/Douglas-Home
1964	5	Lab	Wilson
1966	97	Lab	Wilson
1970	31	Con	Heath
1974	0	Lab	Wilson
1974	4	Lab	Wilson/Callaghan
1979	44	Con	Thatcher
1983	144	Con	Thatcher
1987	101	Con	Thatcher
1992	21	Con	Major
1997	178	Lab	Blair
2001	167	Lab	Blair
2005	66	Lab	Blair/Brown
2010		None	Cameron?

 

Source: Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. British Electoral Facts 1832-1999 Ashgate; updated.

Figure 4: UK Electoral Turnout 1832-2010

Source: Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. British Electoral Facts 1832-1999 Ashgate; updated.

 

Figure 5: Electoral system effects

 

	Con	Lab	LD	Other
FPTP	306	258	57	28
STV	246	207	162	35
AV	281	262	79	28
PR List	234	188	150	78

 

Note: Estimated number of seats seats under the 6^th May 2010 share of vote, assuming no change in the distribution of votes and no legal electoral threshold.

Source: Estimates for AV and STV (with 3-5 MPs). Electoral Reform Society. May 10^th 2010. "STV & the parliament that might have been.."

http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/news.php?ex=0&nid=469

Figure 6: May 6^th 2010 UK Election map

Media and Democratic Governance

Is the news media part of the solution to promoting transparent and accountable democratic governance? Or are they part of the problem? On Tuesday 1^st December 2009, the release of a new World Bank study, Public Sentinel, debated this issue at the World Bank in Washington DC. The event brought together Sanjay Pradhan, Vice President, World Bank Institute, Philip Keefer, Lead Research Economist, Development Research Group, and the book's editor, Pippa Norris, Harvard University.

Within the broad context of the major issues facing the international development community, Public Sentinel: News Media & Governance Reform focuses on the performance of the news media as an institution in addressing the challenges of governance. The book seeks to consider three related issues: What ideal roles should media systems play to strengthen democratic governance and thus bolster human development? Under what conditions do media systems actually succeed or fail to fulfill these objectives? What policy interventions work most effectively to close the substantial gap which exists between the democratic promise and performance of the news media as an institution?

The panel discussed the evidence from the book concluding that the next steps would be to produce a practical toolkit which could help World Bank colleagues in country offices, as well as those working in the broader international community, identify the opportunities for effective intervention to strengthen the roles of the news media.

Copies of the new book can be ordered from The World Bank.

Publication Date: November, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-8213-8200-4. SKU: 18200. US$40.

To order, please click here 

To read the policy brief, click here (PDF)

More details are available from CommGAP, The World Bank.

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEVCOMMENG/EXTGOVACC/0,,contentMDK:22343085~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3252001,00.html

Changing media, changing statistics

It is a cliché to acknowledge the rapidly changing world of the mass media, from a static form of transmission from wireless and television sets in the living room, to communications arriving via a plethora of multimedia platforms, where my cable TV comes to me over WiFi to watch on my smart phone, radio is delivered on my IPod, and headlines from the news media are updated 24/7 online. All these developments complicate but also enrich the media environment. What is less often acknowledged is how far behind we are in monitoring use of news and information from these channels through internationally-standardized communication statistics.

UNESCO is the primary agency worldwide with the responsibility to standardize, gather and disseminate communication statistics. For decades national statistical offices counted newspaper circulation figures, and the distribution of television and radio sets, and related data, and UNESCO disseminated the information through their annual yearbook. But the limitations of this traditional approach have rapidly become apparent. At the same time, the international community has rediscovered the important economic and cultural role of 'creative industries', covering everything from music, dance and crafts through fashion, architecture and ceramics to movies, television, and the online world. Moreover the role of the media for development has also attracted new attention, with international agreement in March 2008 to adopt the UNESCO Media Development Indicators .

To catch up with developments, the UNESCO Institute of Statistics in Montreal is in the process of developing and piloting new surveys monitoring newspapers, broadcasting (television and radio), and movies. This week, UNESCO organized an Experts Workgroup meeting from 17^th-19^th November 2009 in San Jose, Costa Rica. The aim was to review the draft questionnaire, along with the accompanying technical notes for the survey completion and the eventual analysis of the data. After pilot tests, the survey is planned for roll out in 2010, with data available the following year.

Once finalized, the survey instrument will be distributed to national statistical offices for the annual collection of statistics. This may sound dry as dust. But in fact this ambitious initiative opens exciting new opportunities for the policy and research communities to understand the diffusion of the new media environment worldwide and the persistence of some old problems facing the role of the media for development. The UNESCO Media Development Indicators emphasize that media development needs to meet certain normative standards:

1. A system of legal regulations conducive to freedom of expression, pluralism and diversity;
2. Plurality and diversity of media ownership;
3. Media should serve as a platform for democratic discourse, reflecting the diversity of views and interests in society;
4. Professional capacity building and civic society institutions underpinning freedom of expression, pluralism and diversity;
5. Infrastructure capacity sufficient to support an independent and pluralistic media.

The planned new UNESCO surveys on newspapers and broadcasting will not provide indicators capable of monitoring and comparing all these standards, but they will go a lot further than is possible at present, especially in terms of assessing the balance of private v. public sectors in broadcasting and newspapers. For the first time, the surveys will also facilitate a global comparison of number of hours devoted to certain types of broadcasting programs (such as news, education, sports, and drama) shown in different countries, as well as the gender diversity of the media workforce, the proportion of domestic and foreign ownership, and the availability of linguistic broadcasting, amongst other aspects.

The workgroup considered the proposed survey instruments and focused attention upon the technical notes which accompany it, grappling with many complex and detailed issues about how best to relate the new data to broader notions of media pluralism and diversity, reflected in the Media Development Indicators. The new media environment is so complicated today that any 'top down' approach to assess its structure can often only grasp at aspects which are inevitably partial. Hence we can measure the number of terrestrial TV channels broadcasting in a country, for example, but does that actually tell us anything in a world where national TV is supplemented by Hulu, You Tube and similar broadband streamlining sources, along with cable and satellite channels. We can measure the number of national daily newspapers with mainly (51%+) public, private or foreign ownership – but does this provide important insights about the primary sources of information available in any country where surfing the New York Times or listening to my local NPR station every morning is as easy in Boston as it is in San Jose or Shanghai? Only a 'bottom-up' approach --where representative sample surveys assess what information people use as their regular sources of information --can start to evaluate the diversity and pluralism of media access in any country with any accuracy. Individual-level data on media uses is increasingly collected for many nations worldwide in surveys such as the Gallup World Poll (covering 140 nations) and The World Values Survey (covering 90+). Expanding upon these sources, by matching them with the structural national data, would be very worthwhile for future research.

UNESCO will work with national statistical offices to develop the capacity to generate the new data. If this initiative succeeds, so that a comprehensive and accurate picture of the media environment can be assembled, the international data will be widely welcomed. What remains to be done, however, for a richer understanding of pluralism and diversity, is to match the new national-level data on the media ownership and structure more closely with additional datasets. This would allow analysts to compare systematically the typical contents of the newspapers and broadcast media, as well as individual-level patterns of usage. If this approach remains outside of UNESCO's role and capacities, it is hoped that other non-profit agencies and independent researchers concerned with media for development will utilize the new data. We urgently need to develop robust and comparable international indicators which combine the analysis of the media environment with an understanding of the media contents and audience.

Measuring democratic governance

Last weekend (30-31^st October 2009), the American Political Science Association (APSA) organized a conference on Democratic Audits and Governmental Indicators, hosted by the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. This meeting was held at the initiative of Professor Henry Brady, President-elect of APSA and Dean of the Goldman School, and it is the start of developing a year-long APSA taskforce on this topic. The meeting generated lively debate among leading scholars, experts, and representatives from some of the major multilateral organizations and advocacy groups engaged in generating and using governance indicators.

The focus of the APSA initiative is timely since the third wave era of democratization has seen a burgeoning array of diagnostic tools designed to monitor the quality of democratic governance. Political indicators are now widely used by the international community, by national governments and by advocacy groups to evaluate needs and determine policy priorities, to highlight problems and identify benchmark practices, and to evaluate the effectiveness of programmatic interventions.

The most commonly-used indicators focus on issues such as the existence of democracy, civil liberties and political rights, the extent of 'good governance', respect for human rights, perceptions of corruption, the degree of women's empowerment, levels of civic engagement, the extent of conflict, the distribution of social capital, and many other related topics.

The expansion of indicators has been accompanied by important gains in the level of conceptual sophistication, methodological transparency, scope, and geographic coverage of all these measures. Nevertheless there remain considerable concern that the proliferation of indices has not been accompanied by sufficient quality checks, for example through the transparent publications of technical notes about how each of these measures are constructed, the degree of measurement error, and the sources of funding and accountability.

Types of indicators

Four types of indicators have become common:

1. Elite-level perceptual judgments are an important source of information. Organizations commonly use standardized questionnaires distributed to 'expert' sources, typically including scholars and researchers, country analysts, journalists, lawyers, business executives, independent consultants, human rights observers, and NGO staff. This approach is exemplified by Freedom House's process employing teams of researchers to assess the state of civil liberties and political rights worldwide, by Transparency International use of experts to construct the Corruption Perceptions Index, and by Reporters without Borders survey used to generate its annual Press Freedom index.
2. Many indicators are also compiled from official data based on administrative records collected by public officials, national statistical offices, and multinational organizations, for example concerning levels of voter turnout in national elections (collated by International IDEA), public access to the news media and new ICTs (UNESCO/ITU), and the proportion of women in national parliaments (IPU).
3. Recent decades have also witnessed a substantial growth in the range and scope of cross-national public opinion surveys. Major cross-national and time-series surveys of public opinion include the Euro-barometer and related EU surveys (which started in 1970), the European Election Study (1979), the European Values Survey and the World Values Survey (1981), the International Social Survey Programme (1985), the Global Barometers (1990 and various), the Comparative National Elections Project (1990), the European Voter and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (1995), the European Social Survey (2002), the Transatlantic Trends survey (2002), the Pew Global Attitudes project (2002), and the Gallup World Poll (2005). These surveys allow a representative sample of the general public to express their views about the quality of democracy in their own country, as well as to assess the performance of their government leaders, institutions, and policies, confidence in government institutions and satisfaction with democracy, patterns of political behavior and civic engagement, and social and political values.
4. Lastly, qualitative audits have also become increasingly popular, whether concerning the state of democracy in a country or more narrowly focused upon specific sectors, such as media audits.

The use of different data sources, and their combination in certain indicators, raises many important and complex questions. In particular, do indicators based on mass or elite surveys coincide or do they diverge? Where perceptions differ, which source provides the most legitimate, useful, valid, and reliable benchmarks for both scholars and practitioners? Elite evaluations are commonly assumed, usually implicitly, to provide the factually 'correct' and more reliable assessment. By contrast the public is often usually believed to be mistaken, unaware, ill-informed, or simply misguided in their judgments.

Clearly public evaluations can be flawed – as can expert perceptions – for multiple reasons. Instead of assuming that expert perceptual indicators always provide the most valid and reliable measurement, it is more appropriate to conclude, more agnostically, that no single best measure or indicator of democratic governance exists for all purposes; instead, as Collier and Adcock suggest, specific choices are best justified pragmatically by the theoretical framework and analytical goals used in any study.

The most prudent strategy is to compare the results of alternative indicators at both mass and elite levels, including those available from cross-national public opinion surveys, to see if the findings remain robust and consistent irrespective of the specific measures employed for analysis. If so, then this generates greater confidence in the reliability of the results, since the main generalizations hold irrespective of the particular measures which are used. If not, then we need to consider how far any differences in the results can be attributed to the underlying concepts and methodologies which differ among these measures.

Moreover the available elite-level perceptual indicators are relatively blunt instruments, whether for assessing the quality of democracy, for program performance evaluation, or for diagnosing specific problems of concern within any particular state. For policymakers, in some circumstances, the legitimacy derived from professionally-conducted public opinion polls may also make these preferable indicators of democratic governance.

Therefore, social surveys can play an important role when seeking to diagnose, monitor, and strengthen the quality of democratic governance across and within many states worldwide. Representative and professional surveys of public opinion are likely to generate results which prove more politically legitimate, disaggregated, and useful for policymakers, practitioners and research analysts than reliance upon expert perceptions alone.

Next steps

In thinking about how APSA could take this work forward, many fruitful ideas were suggested by participants. The following six-step strategy represents some of the ways that APSA can contribute to strengthening the quality of democratic governance indicators.

Strategic Options	(i) Stimulate scholarly debate & collaboration	(ii) Develop consultancy directory	(iii) Recommend authoritative scientific standards	(iv) One stop data shop	(v) Train users	(vi) Develop innovative indices
Activities	Commission meta-analysis thematic articles	Online directory of expert consultants available for practitioners	Establish authoritative standards/code for methods, data collection, validity, reliability, transparency	Develop integrated annual x-sectional and time-series datasets	Pre-APSA workshops for practitioners and younger scholars	Incentivize APSA sections to develop innovative indices; use membership networks for expert surveys
Pros	Useful scholarly reviews	Service for members and practitioners	Improve practices; voluntary code; rating of standards	Facilitate indicator comparisons and simplify for users	Draws on APSA skills and expertise ; capacity development	Generate unique data; already used for ideological party scales
Costs/ limits	Minimal costs; rarely reaches practitioners	Minimal costs; needs public evaluation feedback to be useful	Fund report workgroup meetings	Fund RAs; Reinvent wheel? QoG Institute	Minimal costs	Fund 2-3 section-organized annual workshops awards
Products	Special issue PS	Online directory	Publish and disseminate APSA Report and guidelines	Online annual datasets	Workshops; training guidelines; video?	New disaggregated indices of democratic governance

 

More information

For more details about the meeting, including the full list of participants, slide presentations, bibliographies, and further resources, see

http://sites.google.com/site/democracyaudit/

Innovations in media and development

The world of traditional journalism is in the process of radical dislocation. Some old communication organizations are innovating and responding successfully by transforming themselves to the new challenges in news and technology; others are going under.

To consider how best to respond to these challenges and opportunities, the Salzburg Global Seminar has been meeting from 7-10^th October 2009 in the Schloss Leopoldkron, Salzburg to bring together some of the major donor organizations – multilateral agencies including the World Bank, European Commission, and UNDP, bilateral donors such as USAid and the Swedish International Development Agency, and a range of non-profit foundations such as the BBC World Service Trust, the Open Society Foundation, the Omidyar Network, and the Knight Foundation.

One of the central debates at the meeting concerns the issue of the role of the media in governance and development. Many speakers emphasized the impact of the news media and new ICTs on government transparency and accountability. Speakers highlighted the way that journalists, NGOs, and citizens can throw new light on the public sector delivery of goods and services, or decision-making processes, to strengthen the accountability of elected and appointed public officials. This issue is of particular concern in the attempt to stamp out corruption, and to monitor the effectiveness of development investments. Many organizations are investing in innovative projects which seek to generate more open government, such as the Sunlight Foundation,

One of the sessions at the meeting presented the conclusions of a new book, Public Sentinel, which I edited and which is forthcoming with the CommGAP program of The World Bank. The study argues that strengthening government transparency is an important function, especially in democratic states. But the news media and civic organizations can play other vital roles as well, including agenda-setting, through highlighting social needs and priorities, including news about natural disasters, international conflict, and humanitarian crisis, as well as providing a balanced public platform for deliberation about public affairs among diverse interests, groups, and sectors.

Numerous examples of relevant initiatives seeking to achieve these objectives were presented at the seminar. One comes from the Media Development Load Fund which has been investing in independent news outlets in countries with a history of media oppression. In Indonesia, for example, until 1998 radio journalism was strictly controlled and obliged to broadcast government news. After liberalization, a new radio news agency KBR68H successfully developed to provides a wide range of independent news, including investigative journalism, strengthening professional journalism ethics. Another example comes from the Open Society Foundation which has sought to provide resources for organizations seeking to protect press freedom and funds to strengthen the legal defense of independent journalism, to promote civic engagement, and to support minority media, such as communication initiatives among the Roma community. Other initiatives were presented by the Knight Foundation which provides funds for digital innovations, new media programs, and open source software which can strengthen news.

The meeting will seek to expand collaboration among donors and to encourage further innovation and debate.