Pippa Norris's Weblog

UK scores worst in electoral integrity in Western Europe. Here’s why.

Pippa Norris

(Harvard and Sydney Universities)

This was previously published in the PSA UK Blog 15th March 2016

Issues of electoral malpractice have received growing attention in the UK. The Commons Library briefing on Electoral offences since 2010 gives details of the reports published by the Electoral Commission and the Associations of Chief Police Officers on cases of alleged malpractice. Questions have arisen over insecure postal ballots, proxy voting, and fraudulent practices. The Electoral Commission issued warnings of potential ‘ethnic kinship’ voting in British Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, a practice thought to make these areas particularly vulnerable to electoral fraud. Sir Eric Pickles, the Government’s Anti-Corruption Champion, has reviewed electoral fraud to make recommendations on what could be done to tackle the problem. Dominic Grieve, the former attorney general, has claimed that electoral fraud is a ‘growing phenomena’ in British elections.  

Polling Day in the UK General Election

The UK General Election on May 7th 2015 certainly generated several media reports of alleged malpractices and shortfalls.

• On polling day, technical glitches were reported in Hackney and Dorset following problems with the electoral roll and distribution of cards for the incorrect polling station, blamed by officials on information technology and printing errors.

• Bournemouth council apologized after 100 people were unable to cast their vote in the local elections because an administrative blunder had led to the wrong ballot papers being issued. Earlier 250,000 ballot papers went missing after a printer’s van was stolen in Eastbourne and Hastings.

• The Electoral Commission investigated complaints that some overseas voters had not received their voting packs in time. The Guardian reported that Metropolitan police received 18 allegations of electoral fraud in the run up to polling day.

• In Tower Hamlets, the High Court suspended the Mayor, Lutfur Rahman, after he was found guilty of falsifying postal votes and putting undue pressure on voters at polling stations during the 2014 local and European elections.

• In Darlington, the BBC reported that the UKIP candidate’s name was missing on ballot papers.

• Finally, the Telegraph reported that the Scottish Tory party leader tweeted claims of voter intimidation in Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale, with the allegations investigated by local police.

None of these were major issues, compared with problems common in many other countries, but they may still have undermined public confidence in the electoral process. When asked beforehand in the British Election Study, the majority of citizens expected that the election would be conducted fairly, but almost one fifth (18%) thought that it would be unfairly conducted.

Comparative evidence of electoral integrity in the UK

But are media reports and political claims of fraud exaggerated? How does the quality of UK general elections compare with other established democracies – and indeed worldwide?

New evidence to give insights into this issue has been gathered by the Electoral Integrity Project. The 2015 annual report compares the risks of flawed and failed elections, and how far countries around the world meet international standards. The report gather assessments from over 2000 experts to evaluate the perceived integrity of all 180 national parliamentary and presidential contests held between 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2015 in 139 countries worldwide, including 54 national elections held last year. Forty experts are asked to assess each election, using 49 questions, with an average response rate of 30%. The overall 100-point Perceptions of Electoral Integrity index is constructed by summing the responses.

To summarize the evidence, Figure 1 illustrates the contrasts in the overall 100-point PEI index for all the countries covered in the survey since 2012, divided by global region.

Poor rating of UK elections compared with West European democracies

The results show that the May 2015 UK general election scored the worst of all West European states, ranking only 39 out of all 139 countries worldwide.

By contrast, Scandinavia is rated most highly in overall levels of electoral integrity, not surprisingly given the long history of democracy in the region. The rankings in PEI worldwide are led by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden – which also do well in most standard indices of the quality of democratic governance. The UK scores around 20 points less on the 100-point PEI Index than the top ranking Scandinavian states.

At the same time, however, contrasts are observed even among similar European Union member states and post-industrial societies; Mediterranean Europe usually performs less well than Northern Europe.

Worldwide the UK also performed less well than many newer democracies, such as Estonia, Lithuania, Uruguay and less well than comparable Anglo-American democracies like Canada, New Zealand and Australia, with the important exception of the United States.

Problems in UK elections

But what were the weakest stages? Contemporary debates have claimed that the problem is voter fraud. Yet Tony James and Alistair Clarke argue that in fact voter registration procedures are the greater problem, based on a survey of poll workers and electoral officials in local government. The UK results in PEI can be broken down in more detail to compare each of the eleven stages of the electoral cycle, in Figure 2. The results show that the UK was seen by experts to perform poorly on electoral laws, constituencies boundaries, and media coverage (especially fair and balanced newspaper reporting). By contrast, the voting, results and count stages (where fraud might emerge) are relatively positively rated by experts, lending support to the argument by James and Clark.

[Figure 2 about here]

Disproportional electoral laws

The poor marks given for the fairness of electoral laws is likely to tap into ongoing controversies about the electoral system. Despite considerable debate in recent decades over electoral reform, and many other systems in use within the UK, the electoral system for Westminster continues to use the plurality ‘First-past-the-Post’ system with 650 single member constituencies. Alan Renwick used three indices to demonstrate a consistently high level of disproportionality in UK general elections since 1974, when the Labour-Conservative two party system broke down, and the 2015 contest was no exception. In general, the UK Independence Party did particularly badly in its votes:seats share in this contest (with almost 4 million or 12.6% of the nationwide vote share and only one MP), as did the Liberal Democrats. By contrast, with just over 9 million votes, Labour racked up 232 MPs. In the global comparison, elections with majoritarian systems generally performed worse in PEI than those using PR.

 

Voter registration

Other current debates in the UK concern the procedures used for voter registration, although this was not highlighted as an issue of major concern by the PEI experts. The James-Clarke survey suggests that the electoral register needs attention: they found that over two thirds of polling stations turned away at least one citizen from voting in the 2015 election because their name was not on the electoral register.

 

The Conservative government has recently introduced individual voter register, replacing household registration, a reform justified by ministers as a more secure system guarding against alleged voter fraud. Nevertheless, critics charge that this may discourage participation by several sectors of the electorate, such as students and ethnic minorities. Last month, the Electoral Commission reported about 770,000 names had been removed from the register as the government introduced the requirement that people sign up as individuals rather than as households,  leading to Labour complaints about the risks of disenfranchisement.

Media coverage

The critique of unfair or imbalanced newspaper coverage in the PEI survey also reflects long-standing debates in British political communications.  Systematic evidence confirms this pattern continued in 2015.  Loughborough University produced the most thorough content analysis examining campaign coverage in ten major daily papers during the UK campaign.   The results suggest that according to ‘stopwatch balance’ (how many column inches were devoted to quotations from spokespersons in each party) there was a strong bias towards the Conservatives, with Labour coverage in second place. For example, 45% of all quotation space was given to Conservative spokespersons, compared with 30% for Labour and around 11% for the Lib Dems. The balance of positive/negative coverage was less pronounced except for a negative bias towards the SNP.

Therefore, the PEI results do suggest that there are familiar issues about the quality of elections which should concern the Electoral Commission.  The Westminster system is perceived by election experts to perform poorly compared with many equivalent Continental Europe and Scandinavian democracies. The problems highlighted may not be particularly surprising to long-standing observers of British elections.  But for Westminster to do worse than new democracies like Benin, Estonia, and Costa Rica suggests more deep-rooted cause for genuine concern.

Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at Harvard University, ARC Laureate and Professor of Government and IR at the University of Sydney, and Director of the Electoral Integrity Project. [email protected]

 

Fig 1: Global comparison of electoral integrity

Note: Scores on the 100-point Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index, where higher scores equals greater integrity

Source: Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI-4.0): www.electoralintegrityindex.com

Fig. 2: Perceived integrity in the 2015 UK general election

Note: Scores on the 100-point Perceptions of Electoral Integrity sub-indices, where higher scores equals greater integrity

Source: Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI-4.0): www.electoralintegrityindex.com

Afghanistan, Bahrain and Syria the five worst elections during 2014

How do we know when elections succeed – or fail?

Many recent contests have ended with bitter disputes about electoral integrity. The issue is exemplified by partisan debates in the United States over Republican allegations of voter fraud (impersonation) and Democratic claims of voter suppression. But the Florida disease has become contagious in other Anglo-American democracies, generating controversies about the Fair Elections Act in Canada, lost ballot boxes in Australia, and insecure postal ballots in Britain.  The consequences are even more serious elsewhere in the world where contentious elections have sparked massive street protests in Cambodia, a military coup d’état in Thailand, bloody violence in 2007 in Kenya, and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The recent six week postponement of Nigeria’s presidential election and delays in distributing voter ID cards has raised widespread concern.

But how do we know when complaints about electoral malpractices reflect genuine flaws and failures, and when they are false claims stoked by sore losers?

The expert survey

The Electoral Integrity Project based at Harvard and Sydney Universities has just released a new report and dataset for The Year in Elections 2014.

Expert assessments evaluate the state of the world’s elections each year. The third release of the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) data-set covers 127 national parliamentary and presidential contests held from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2014 in 107 countries worldwide. At present, the cumulative data covers almost two-thirds of all 173 independent nation-states holding direct popular nation-wide elections for the executive or lower house of the national parliament (excluding a dozen micro-states like Andorra and Monaco, and eight states like Saudi Arabia and UAE without direct elections). More elections will be evaluated as they are held in future years.

Evidence is gathered from a global survey of 1,429 domestic and international election experts (with a response rate of 29%). Immediately after each contest, the quality of each election is evaluated based on 49 indicators. Responses are clustered into eleven stages occurring throughout the electoral cycle and then summed to construct an overall 100-point expert Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) index and ranking.

The world map of electoral integrity identifies the best and worst elections around the globe during 2014.

 

The global map of electoral integrity, 2012-2014

Source: Electoral Integrity Project. 2015.  The expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, Release 3 (PEI-3). A dynamic version of the map and details about the categories are available online.

Failed elections

• During 2014, the five worst elections worldwide were in Egypt, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Bahrain and Syria (respectively), all of which failed to meet international standards.
• In the second round of the Afghanistan presidential election on 5^th April 2014, for example, a bitter dispute about alleged fraud “on an industrial scale”, resolved only by an eventual UN/US brokered power-sharing arrangement,   undermined confidence in the process and outcome.
• In Syria, the presidential election on 3^rd June 2014 was attempted in the midst of a bloody civil war and deep humanitarian crisis where polling did not take place in rebel areas and an estimated 9 million Syrians have fled their homes.

Contests meeting international standards

• By contrast, during 2014, the five best elections around the globe were in Lithuania (ranked 1^st), Costa Rica, Sweden, Slovenia and Uruguay (respectively).
• For example, the Lithuanian presidential election on 11^th and 25^th May 2014 celebrated how far democratic practices and respect for human right have become entrenched in this country since escaping the Soviet era in 1990. The parliamentary republic has a mixed executive, with government led by Algirdas Butkevičius, the prime minister from the Social Democratic Party. For the presidential election, citizens could choose on the ballot paper from seven candidates representing a wide range of parties. The incumbent and the country’s first female President, Dalia Grybauskaitė, led in the opinion polls and in the second round run-off she was comfortably reelected with 58% of the vote on an independent ticket, defeating Zigmantas Balčytis of the Social Democratic Party. Before the contest, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) needs-assessment mission reported that the legal framework and electoral administration were both sound, the media environment was pluralistic, with free air time for candidates, and there was no need to send observers. In the complete list of countries included in the PEI_3 survey since 2012, the Lithuanian election was ranked similar to Norway and Sweden across the Baltic Sea, in stark contrast to its neighbor Belarus.

US Congressional elections

• Compared with 127 contests covered in PEI-3 since 2012, it is striking that in the United States, the 2012 presidential election (ranked 42^nd) and the 2014 Congressional elections (ranked 48^th) scored lowest among all Western democracies.  
• Experts expressed concern about US electoral laws and voter registration procedures, both areas of heated partisan debate, as well as partisan gerrymandering of district boundaries and the deregulation of campaign finance. As a result, the US mid-term contests last year were ranked as similarly in quality to elections in Colombia and Bulgaria.
• In January 2014, the US Presidential Commission on Electoral Administration recommended a wide range of practical reforms for state and local officials, such as how to overcome long lines at the ballot box. But it failed to address the major obstacles arising from the role of partisan officials regulating registration and balloting, excessively decentralized administration, and a campaign awash with money.

What drives electoral integrity?

• Electoral integrity is generally strengthened by three factors; democracy, development, and power‐sharing constitutions. Longer experience over successive contests usually consolidates democratic practices, deepens civic cultures, and builds the capacity of professional electoral management bodies. Economic development provides the resources and technical capacity for professional electoral administration. Power‐sharing institutions, such as the free press and independent parliaments, serve as watch-dogs curbing malpractices. Systematic cross-national research has established these general patterns but still several important exceptions can be observed. Several developing societies and emerging economies which are genuinely committed to human rights and democracy can overcome these obstacles to strengthen their record of electoral integrity. By contrast, irregularities can and do arise even in long-established democracies.
• States in Africa and the Middle East usually face the greatest risks of failed elections, as shown by Mauritania, Iraq, Egypt and Bahrain. But there are clear exceptions within these regions, notably the successful Tunisian presidential and legislative elections, and fairly well‐rated contests in South Africa.

The stock of democracy and electoral integrity

 

Note: The ‘stock of democracy’ is calculated from the cumulative record of political rights and civil liberties, as estimated by Freedom House Freedom around the World 1972-201.

Source: Electoral Integrity Project. 2015.  The expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, Release 3 (PEI-3).

Problems during the electoral cycle

 

Note: Each stage in the electoral cycle was evaluated using 100-point scales.
Source: Electoral Integrity Project. 2015.  The expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, Release 3 (PEI-3).

• The most serious risks using arise during the electoral cycle from disparities in political finance and media coverage during the campaign. These stages are assessed by experts as far more widespread problems than malpractices occurring on election‐day or its aftermath, such as ballot stuffing or fraud.

More details can be found from new books by Pippa Norris on Why Electoral Integrity Matters and Why Elections Fail, bothfrom Cambridge University Press, New York.

Further information, the complete PEI_3 dataset, a YouTube video presentation, and a copy of the Year in Elections 2014 report by Pippa Norris, Ferran Martinez i Coma and Max Groemping can be downloaded from www.electoralintegrityproject.com 

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The depth of Ukrainian divisions between east and west?

Pippa Norris

Current events escalating in Crimea clearly highlight the polarization among political leaders and activists in Ukraine. Developments reflect conflicting visions of the country’s diplomatic ties and regional identities, whether as part of the future European Union or else linked to Russia and the legacy Commonwealth of Independent States.

But how much do the recent events reflect cultural cleavages among ordinary people living in Ukrainian society?

Cross-national survey evidence to examine Ukrainian public opinion is available from the World Values Survey. This study, which now includes more than 90 countries, is a global investigation of socio-cultural and political change. The survey started with the first wave in 1981 and the 6^th wave contains surveys from around 60 countries with data gathered from 2010-2014. The World Values Survey (WVS) is a non-profit, academic survey program representing the largest exploration into human values and cultural change around the world.

In 2011, during the period when President Viktor Yanukovych was in power for the Party of Regions, the 6^th wave study conducted a representative survey of 1,500 Ukrainians, almost equally divided by the language spoken at home into Russian and Ukrainian speakers.  For convenience these groups are labelled ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ Ukrainians. For comparison, the World Values Survey also conducted a similar survey of public opinion in the neighboring states of Poland (#966) in 2012 and Russia (#2,500) in 2011. The comparison allows us to see how far Eastern and Western Ukrainians share similar cultural values with each other on many issues, such as support for democracy or confidence in government, or whether they are closer to the values found in each neighboring state.

Attitudes towards democracy

First, do Ukrainians differ in their attitudes towards democracy? Are Western Ukrainians more enthusiastic for reforms strengthening political rights and civil liberties, while Eastern Ukrainians hanker for the strong state and stability of their authoritarian past?

 

One way to examine attitudes is through using a 0-10 point scale, where respondents were asked to assess the importance of living in a country which is democratic. Figure 1 illustrates the results showing that there are indeed some modest differences; Western Ukrainians rated the importance of democracy marginally higher than those living in the East. Western Ukrainians are therefore located a bit closer to political attitudes found in Poland, while Eastern Ukrainians express values which are slightly closer to Russian attitudes. But the gaps within Ukraine were extremely modest.

For another measure, people were also asked to use a similar 0-10 point scale to express their satisfaction with the performance of democracy in their own country. Here Ukrainians in both regions proved somewhat critical of how democracy worked in practice, fairly close to the opinions of most Russians, while by contrast Poles proved more satisfied with how democracy worked.

  Another way that political attitudes and values can be measured concerns public reactions to statements describing several alternative forms of rule.  Respondents were asked in the survey whether they thought it was good or bad to have a strong leader ‘who does not have to bother with parliaments or elections’, a way of tapping into approval of authoritarian rule without mentioning the ‘d’ word.

Here it appears from Figure 2 that Ukrainians overwhelmingly agree with the desire for strong leadership – and in this both Eastern and Western regions are strikingly similar to Russians.  Almost three quarters of Ukrainians and Russians approve of the idea of strong political leadership, perhaps expressing frustration with the process and outcome of elections. Only citizens in Poland display a stronger commitment to the principles and procedures of liberal democracy by strongly rejecting this form of rule.

Nevertheless public opinion is not wholly clear and consistent; when people were asked whether they approve of having a democratic political system, it appears that public opinion favors this form of government in all the societies under comparison. This pattern is also found elsewhere around the world, where the principles of democracy are widely endorsed, even among citizens living under one party states and authoritarian regimes.

Finally, what about trust and confidence in their government and parliament?  Here again there are some modest contrasts between Western and Eastern Ukrainians, following the expected direction. In 2011, those living in Eastern Ukraine expressed slightly more confidence and trust (+8% points) in the government of President Victor Yanukovych (Party of Regions) than those living in Western Ukraine. This reflects the map of votes cast in the January 17^th 2010 presidential contest. On the other hand, only around one fifth of Ukrainians expressed ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot of confidence’ in both their government and parliament, compared with far more Russian confidence in President Putin.

Conclusions

Overall what emerges are the striking cultural similarities rather than differences found in political values among the publics living in Eastern and Western Ukraine. On issues such as relatively strong endorsement of democratic values and ideals, and simultaneous lack of satisfaction with the way that democracy works, Ukrainians in both regions display the typical characteristics of ‘critical citizens’ found in many parts of the world (Norris 2011). Similarly  Ukrainians are not alone in the tensions observed between those seeking strong leaders and yet also approving of democracy. And the low confidence in core political institutions is also far from unique to this country.

Admittedly there are some small but important contrasts between Western and Eastern Ukrainians, notably in voting support for the Party of the Regions and in confidence in the government of President Yanukovych. Other explorations of the data suggest that indeed Eastern Ukrainians have more confidence in CIS than those living in the East. But the political attitudes which are shared among all Ukrainians are far more evident from this comparison than the values which differ. Not surprisingly, although language divides, there are many other aspects of Ukrainian culture and historical traditions which have been shared over the centuries. Even if the leaders and activists are sharply divided, this evidence suggest that the cultural differences within Ukraine remains fairly modest.

Reference:

Norris, Pippa. 2011. Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited New York: Cambridge University Press. 

New problems of electoral integrity

Claims of voter fraud and voter suppression in US elections. Robo-call scandals in Canada. Allegations of vote-buying in Mexican contests. Ballot-stuffing in Armenia. Heavy-handed suppression of human rights in Iranian contests.

What do all these problems have in common?

On June 3-4th 2013, over seventy leading international scholars and practitioners met at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University to discuss electoral integrity. More than thirty papers presented new research investigating the causes and consequences of problems of electoral integrity. 

Organized by the Electoral Integrity Project, the workshop debated issues as diverse as public trust and confidence in elections in the United States, Latin America, and sub-Saharen Africa, the performance of Electoral Management Bodies in the UK, Central America and Sudan, and new techniques for detecting voter fraud in Ghana, the US and Afghanistan. All papers are available at www.electoralintegrityproject.com.

The workshop concluded with a panel discussing the next steps in the research agenda which would be most useful for the international community. The panel included representatives from the Carter Center, IFES, the Organization of American States,  the United Nations Development Programme, Democracy International and international IDEA. 

Overall the workshop strengthened the networks of scholars and practitioners focused on these challenges and laid the outlines for the next generation of research strengthening electoral integrity. The subsequent workshop to develop this program will meet in Chicago on 28 August 2013 in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

When do elections fail (and succeed)?

Pippa Norris, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martinez I Coma (Electoral Integrity Project)

In recent years, far too many elections have ended with the major protagonists at loggerheads, parties bitterly disputing the results, and conflict spilling over onto the streets. Cries of fraud are common, especially among losers in tight winner-take-all presidential races.

    When questions about the legitimacy of the outcome arises, is there reliable evidence that contests fail to meet international standards? Or are these simply sour grape attempts to undermine the rightful winners?

    To provide a more systematic, credible, reliable and legitimate source of independent evidence, in early-2013 the Electoral Integrity Project launched a new pilot study seeking to provide an authoritative assessment of the quality of national elections held around the world. The Electoral Integrity Project is developed by a team of scholars at the University of Sydney and Harvard University, led by Professor Pippa Norris, in conjunction with an international advisory board, the International Political Science Association, and many partner organizations in the international community.

    For the pilot study on electoral integrity, conducted in April-May 2013, the project focused upon twenty independent nation-states around the world which had held national presidential or parliamentary elections during the prior six months, (i.e. the period from 1 July to 31 December 2012). 

All the data can be downloaded from www.electoralintegrityproject.com.

    For each country, the project identified around forty election experts, defined as a political scientist (or other social scientist in a related discipline) who had demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process in a particular country. The selection sought a roughly 50:50 balance between international and domestic experts, the latter defined by location or citizenship. Experts were asked to complete an online survey. In total, 226 completed responses were received in the pilot study, representing just under one third of the experts that the project contacted (30%).

    The idea of electoral integrity is defined by the project to refer to agreed international conventions and global norms, applying universally to all countries worldwide through the election cycle, including during the pre-election period, the campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath. The concept is seen as having eleven sub-dimensions in a sequential cycle.

    The survey results are discussed in detail elsewhere but for a quick snapshot, here are the overall rankings in the countries under comparison.

Overall the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and South Korea came top of the rankings, all countries which have had a series of recent elections which are regarded as by observers and media commentators as without major flaws. By contrast, Belarus, the Republic of Congo, Angola, and Ukraine are all seen as performing poorly in elections, an assessment which is also consistent with observer reports.

    Interestingly, the United States ranks 7^th in the countries under comparison, similar to Mexico and slightly below several newer democracies. Thus one finding emerging from the pilot study is that greater experience of democratic elections in any society was not necessarily an accurate predictor of the perceived quality of contemporary elections.

    But what were seen as the key factors driving these results? Over-simple ‘pass-fail’ judgments are of little use to reformers seeking to strengthen the process.

    Table 1 below presents the more fine-grained assessments concerning the performance of each of the eleven sub-dimensions in the electoral cycle. To summarize the comparisons across each of the 100-point standardized scales, using the familiar traffic light symbols, mean assessments below 49 were categorized as ‘low’ in integrity (colored red), and those from 50 to 74 were categorized as ‘moderate’ (colored orange), while scores over 75 were categorized as ‘high’ (colored green).

    The analysis shows that issues of campaign finance were regarded as most problematic across many countries, with more than half the elections seen as performing poorly. Similarly campaign coverage by the news media was highlighted by experts as another area of concern.

The results also highlight specific problems occurring in particular countries, notably the partisan and decentralized nature of gerrymandering district boundaries in the United States (an area where the US achieved its lowest score), problems of the voting process in Venezuela, and challenges of fair and equitable media coverage and campaign finance in Romania. 

    Thus overall the PEI index and dimensional scores help to highlight particular problems in each country which experts suggest deserve special attention by domestic stakeholders and the international community. Where flaws are identified, the next steps in the research are to establish their precise causes, their consequences, and what can be learnt from best practice to remedy the situation in the next contest.

    Source: Pippa Norris, Ferran Martínez i Coma and Richard W. Frank. 2013. The Expert Survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, Pilot Study April 2013:www.electoralintegrityproject.com

Religious tolerance in the West and the Rest

The outbreak of demonstrations against the anti-Islamic movie in Egypt, Libya and many other societies in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia has generated a mountain of commentary. Many American have argued that (a) it is false to blame  United States society (still less the American president) for the actions of one or two Californian hate-spewing fringe extremists; (b) the US culture is exceptionally tolerant by priorititising the principles of the 1st Amendment over restrictions on hate speech (c) other societies, especially Muslim-predominant societies, should become equally tolerant and accept religious pluralism.

But does the type of faith matter? Or is religious tolerance the product of the strength of religiosity, irrespective of whether the society is Muslim or Protestant, Orthodox or Buddhist? In particular, are Muslim societies exceptionally intolerant of people of other faiths, as much Western commentary assumes? And is the U.S. exceptionally tolerant?

In fact, new survey evidence demonstrates a strong link between the strength of religiosity and religious tolerance, irrespective of the predominant type of faith in each society.

The 6th wave of the World Values Survey (conducted in 2010-2012) measured the strength of religiosity by asking respondents to place themselves on a 10-point 'importance of God' scale. The survey also asked people to agree or disagree (on a 4-point scale) with the statement 'The only acceptable religion is my religion'. The results below show the strong link between the strength of religiosity and faith-based tolerance. It is true that Muslim-predominant societies such as Qatar and Morocco turn out to be both highly religious and least tolerant of other faiths. Central Asian 'stans' are also intolerant. But some other highly religious Catholic and Orthodox societies are also moderately intolerant, exemplified by followers of the Apostolic Church in Armenia, Christians in Ghana, and Catholics in Poland and Mexico. By contrast the most secular societies under comparison  also prove the most tolerant, such as Lutheran Sweden and Estonia, Catholic Spain, Protestant New Zealand, Buddhist South Korea.

Levels of economic development are also clearly at work behind these patterns, with the more affluent and educated societies usually displaying the most secular and tolerant profile. Education has long been found to strength social tolerance. The United States, by contrast, is very religious and in the middle of the distribution for religious tolerance, not exceptionally high like Sweden and New Zealand. Similar patterns are evident and the results remain robust if we compare alternative indicators, such as of trust in people from another faith.

Thus it seems likely, as demonstrated in detail elsewhere (Norris and Inglehart 2011) that social tolerance is being driven more by societal levels of affluence and poverty, and thus by the strength of religiosity, more than by any particular type of faith.



Source: The World Values Survey 6th wave 2010-2012. N. 42,345 in 29 societies. See www.worldvaluessurvey.org 

For further reading, see Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2011. Sacred and Secular. Cambridge University Press 2nd Edition.

Beta testing new expert survey: Perceptions of electoral integrity

We are in the process of developing a new survey monitoring expert Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) and we need your help!

The survey plans to contact c.40 experts immediately after each national election (constituent assembly, presidential or parliamentary) to gather views about these contests. Experts will be drawn from many different fields, such as scholars, lawyers, election officials and journalists familiar with elections. We will seek a balance of local residents and international experts and we will aim to achieve c.25 replies per country, working with international agencies and regional networks to identify email contacts for suitable experts. The survey is planned to be repeated after each national contest. The aggregate results for each country will be published via the project website, broken down by question category, as well as through a standardized index measuring Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. National coverage is planned to be global. Over time, as results accumulate, we hope that this will generate valuable information for the research and policy-making communities.

It would be greatly appreciated if colleagues could look briefly at the beta testing version of the survey and if you could send us comments.

https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/data-1/expert-survey

Colleagues may want to try completing the survey, to see if it works for the last election held in each country, or alternatively just send any criticisms, feedback, and ideas to [email protected] . Either way, we would greatly appreciate hearing your advice, no matter how critical. We want to develop the right instrument. Opportunities to comment on the beta testing process will close by 1st October 2012. The survey fieldwork will start in January 2013 and the preliminary results will be evaluated at the Electoral Integrity Project’s next annual workshop, to be held at Harvard 3-4th June 2012.

We look forward to hearing from you.

In addition, several new draft papers are also now available for comment via the website www.electoralintegrityproject.com

Pippa Norris (Harvard University and the University of Sydney), Andrew Reynolds (University of North Carolina) and Jorgen Elklit (Aarhus University)

Muslim integration into Western cultures

In 2005, the International Organization for Migration estimates that among all world regions, Europe hosted the highest number of international migrants (70.5 million). At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the OECD estimates that about one in four or five residents were foreign-born in countries such as Australia (24%), Switzerland (24%), New Zealand (19%), and Canada (18%), as were one in eight in Germany (13%), the United States (13%), and Sweden (12%) OECD 2008).  Due to these developments, European countries which used to be relatively homogeneous in their cultural heritage, historical traditions, ethnic composition, language, lifestyles, and religious faith -- such as Denmark, France, and Sweden -- have become far more socially diverse today

Population flows are diverse. The rapid settlement of Muslim migrants into European societies, in particular, has raised important challenges for how European policymakers manage cultural diversity, maintain social cohesion, and accommodate minorities. This is one of the main reasons for the contemporary strength of anti-immigrant parties, as demonstrated by Marie Le Pen winning 18 percent of the vote for the Front Nationale in the first round of the French presidential elections, on a platform denouncing "Islamification.” The backlash against migration has shaped party politics in many European nations, in countries as diverse as the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway and Sweden. More broadly, concern over Muslim migrants has been heightened by a series of extreme terrorist events attracting global headlines, particularly by 9/11 in the United States, the bombings directed against civilian targets in Madrid (2004), London (2005), and Mumbai (2008).

These events highlight the importance of understanding the process of assimilation, and in particular, how far do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new setting? Answers to these questions not only have important political implications; they also help us understand theoretical debates about whether basic cultural values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or attributes of a given society.  Theories of cultural integration suggest that immigrants gradually absorb the values and norms which predominate in their host society, especially on an inter-generational basis. By contrast, theories of divergence suggest that distinctive social values and norms are enduring and deep-rooted within each nation, shaped by collective histories, common languages, and religious traditions, so that migrant populations are unlikely to abandon their cultural roots when they settle in another country. These claims can be tested empirically by examining whether the basic values of Muslim migrants are closer to those prevailing in their societies of origin or destination.

Evidence can be compared using evidence the five pooled waves of the World Values Survey and European Values Study, a global investigation of socio-cultural and political change from 1981 to 2007. The survey includes systematic data on public opinion in affluent post-industrial societies and in many diverse Islamic states containing Muslim-plurality populations, providing the broadest comparison available from any existing social survey. Societies in the World Values Survey can be classified by their predominant religion. The World Values Survey includes Arab states, both majority Sunni (such as Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt) and majority Shi’a (such as Iran and Iraq), as well as countries in Asia (Azerbaijan, Kyrgystan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia), Central Europe (Bosnia Herzegovina, Albania) and in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso). This allows us to compare the attitudes of three groups: Muslims living in Muslim-predominant societies (termed Societies of Origin), Westerners living in Western societies (termed Societies of Destination), and Muslim migrants living in Western societies.

A series of 13 items were selected and developed into standardized 0 to 100-point scales to monitor cultural values towards gender equality, sexuality, religiosity, and democratic values. Comparisons were drawn among these three social groups, as shown in figure 1. It is apparent that Muslim migrants are consistently located on average in the middle of the value scales, being less conservative than Muslims living in Muslim Societies of Origin, but also less liberal than Westerners living in Western societies. In other words, the position of Muslim migrants proved to be located approximately half-way between the dominant values prevailing within their Destination and their Origins. It is also striking that although much of the European debate has focused on the attitudes and practices towards the roles of men and women, it appears that on the gender equality scale, Muslim minorities are in fact far closer to Western than to Islamic publics.

 

When analyzing the evidence, however, several controls need to be introduced for factors which typically influence social attitudes, such as education, age and sex. After all, Muslim migrants may well prove distinctive from their compatriots for many reasons; for example, younger groups, and those with greater educational qualifications or higher socioeconomic resources, may well find it easier to relocate. Hierarchical linear models (HLM) are most appropriate for this sort of analysis, including multilevel regression analysis. The results confirm that Muslim migrants living in Western societies are located roughly in the center of the cultural spectrum, located between the publics living in Islamic and Western societies. It is entirely possible—indeed, we think it rather likely—that some degree of self-selection may be involved:  those who choose to immigrate to the U.S. or to Spain may already have values that are relatively compatible with those of their future host country.  But even if this is true, these findings contradict the idea that immigrants simply import an unmodified version of the values of their own country into their new host country.  In the long-term, the basic cultural values of migrants appear to change in conformity with the predominant culture of each society. 

Details are forthcoming in Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2012. “Muslim integration into Western cultures: Between Origins and Destimations.” Political Studies 

Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and also ARC Fellow and Professor of Government at the University of Sydney. [email protected]

Ronald Inglehart is Professor of Political Science in the Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan and also Director, Laboratory for Comparative Social Research, Higher School of Economics Moscow and St. Petersburg. [email protected]

Regime change and the ‘Arab spring’

The Arab spring has been marked by the revolutionary downfall and removal of autocratic leaders in Tunisia (President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali), Egypt (President Hosni Mubarrak), and Libya (President Momar Gaddafi). Major protests, strikes, and demonstrations have occurred throughout the region, destabilizing regimes in Syria and Yemen. Stirrings of popular unrest during the 'Arab spring' have renewed debate about the regimes most likely to replace traditional autocracies in the region. These events have encouraged many commentators to hope that the Middle East and North Africa is experiencing the gradual transition from autocracy to secular democracies, where moderate Islamic parties, new constitutions, and elected governments gradually expand human rights, including religious freedoms, pluralism, and tolerance of diverse faiths. Preliminary results from the October elections in Tunisia suggest victory for the moderate Islamic party Ennahda. Yet it remains unclear whether the outcome will be similar for moderate forces in Egypt and Libya. Contemporary events remain in continuous flux, the final outcome of these developments are far from settled, and other commentators fear that the instability caused by the popular uprisings will allow openings for conservative and more extremist religious forces to come to power, enforcing stricter interpretation of Islamic law.

Do Muslim publics want secular democracies, characterized by religious pluralism, separation of religious and government authorities, tolerance of diverse religious beliefs and practices, moderate parties, and constitutions where no single type of faith is privileged, following the Turkish model? Or do they prefer regimes where constitutions reflect Islamic principles, spiritual authorities predominate in politics, conservative Islamic parties prevail, and religious courts enforce Sharia law, reflecting the Iranian model? Or, alternatively, do many Muslim publics fall somewhere between these two poles?

Many factors will probably determine the final type of constitutional settlements and the regimes which develop in the countries in the Arab region which are currently experiencing challenges to autocracy. The new settlements will be shaped by historical traditions, the type of political elite, levels of economic development, the power and role of the armed forces, and external pressures from the international community, among many other factors. But preferences in the mass culture are also likely to play a role in any constitutional settlement, especially where these are subject to popular referendum, as in Tunisia. It is therefore important to determine whether the general public in Muslim-plurality nations favors the Turkish model of secular democracy, the Iranian model of religious autocracy, or another type of constitutional settlement located between these poles.

Regimes can be classified using a four-fold typology which distinguishes preferences for liberal democracy (on the horizontal axis) and preferences for secular states, defined here as those favoring high levels of religious pluralism and freedom, on the vertical axis. Comparison of Muslim-plurality societies suggest that they are governed today by diverse types of regimes, which can be illustrated by the contrasts among Mali (exemplifying a secular democracy), Chad (classified as a secular autocracy), and Tunisia (as a religious autocracy).

	Low << Liberal democracy >> High
Low << Religious pluralism >> High	Secular autocracy	Secular democracy
	Religious autocracy	Religious democracy

 

Public preferences for each type of regime

 

What type of regime do Muslims publics prefer? The World Values Survey 1999-2007 provides data in a wide variety of societies to examine the distribution of public opinion towards secularism and democracy.

 

Preferences for a secular state are measured by two items: "How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?(i) Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections; (ii) Religious leaders should not influence government decisions."

 

Support for democratic principles is measured by the question: "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (i) Having a democratic political system. (ii) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; (iii) Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country; (iv) Having the army rule."

 

Figure 1: Public preferences for regimes

 

 

The results of the comparison in Figure 1 shows that the publics in Muslim-majority societies displayed diverse preferences; hence people living in some countries, such as Tanzania and Morocco, favored secular democracy, while others such as Albania and Indonesia proved slightly less supportive of democracy although equally secular, and still others, such as Algeria, favored religious autocracy. Overall, therefore, although some assume commonality, the contrasts among Muslim-plurality societies stand out.

Source: More details can be found in Pippa Norris. 2011. 'Muslim support for secular democracy'. www.pippanorris.com

Lack of women at Westminster

Now that the dust has settled after the May 2010 general election, and the outcome for women is clear, there are many reasons for disappointment.

Four women sit in the new cabinet (14%), led by Theresa May as Home Secretary, while Caroline Spelman is the new environment secretary, Cheryl Gillan is the Welsh secretary, and Baroness Warsi is minister without portfolio. The British cabinet lags far behind many European countries; Spain has 53% women in its Cabinet, while Germany has 37% and France 33%.

Overall 142 female MPs were elected to Westminster (21.8%) – more than one in five of the total members in the House of Commons. This was another steady increase, up from 128 or 19.8% of all members in 2005 – but only a modest gain. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union figures, after the election Britain ranks 55^th worldwide in the proportion of women in the lower house of parliament, lagging far behind the familiar litany of global leaders such as Sweden, Norway and Finland, as well as European democracies such as Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands. Despite the gains in numbers at Westminster, in fact Britain's international ranking slipped 10 places since 2005, because other countries – including many newer democracies – are advancing at a faster pace.

Labour continues to have the best record of the major parties, now with 81 women MPs (almost one third or 31%). The Conservatives made substantial seat gains, including those contested by women candidates, but still elected only 48 women MPs (15.7%). Meanwhile, despite all the egalitarian rhetoric, the Liberal Democrats actually managed to fall back to just 7 female MPs (12%), and they haven't nominated any for their five Cabinet posts.

	Conservative		Labour		Liberal Democrat		Total in all parties (*)
	PPC	MPs	PPC	MPs	PPC	MPs	N. of all MPs	% of all MPs
1979	31	13	52	11	52	0	19	3.0
1983	40	13	78	10	75	0	23	3.5
1987	46	17	92	21	106	2	41	6.3
1992	63	20	138	37	143	2	60	9.2
1997	69	13	157	101	140	3	120	18.2
2001	92	14	146	94	135	5	118	17.9
2005	118	17	166	97	142	10	128	19.8
2010	149	48	191	81	134	7	142 (*)	21.8

(*) Including all other UK parties (in 2010, the Greens, SNP, SF, SDLP, Alliance and Independent each elected one women MP.)

In a sense, this is all water under the bridge. But there are still important issues which need to be addressed.

In particular, right now only two candidates have declared themselves for the Labour party leadership contest – the bros David and Ed Miliband. Both have considerable potential as the next generation of rising Labour leaders. But where are the women? Harriet Harman, the Deputy leader of the Labour party, would have been an obvious contender, but she has quite firmly refused to stand. Other names which have been mooted in this context include Tessa Jowell, Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood), and Emily Thornberry (Islington South & Finsbury).

Ed Miliband, who is a personable candidate but without deep experience of high office, stood in part due to a grassroots web campaign among supporters.

If you could encourage any of the Labour women MPs to stand in the leadership contest, who would this be??