Pippa Norris's Weblog

UK scores worst in electoral integrity in Western Europe. Here’s why.

Pippa Norris

(Harvard and Sydney Universities)

This was previously published in the PSA UK Blog 15th March 2016

Issues of electoral malpractice have received growing attention in the UK. The Commons Library briefing on Electoral offences since 2010 gives details of the reports published by the Electoral Commission and the Associations of Chief Police Officers on cases of alleged malpractice. Questions have arisen over insecure postal ballots, proxy voting, and fraudulent practices. The Electoral Commission issued warnings of potential ‘ethnic kinship’ voting in British Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, a practice thought to make these areas particularly vulnerable to electoral fraud. Sir Eric Pickles, the Government’s Anti-Corruption Champion, has reviewed electoral fraud to make recommendations on what could be done to tackle the problem. Dominic Grieve, the former attorney general, has claimed that electoral fraud is a ‘growing phenomena’ in British elections.  

Polling Day in the UK General Election

The UK General Election on May 7th 2015 certainly generated several media reports of alleged malpractices and shortfalls.

• On polling day, technical glitches were reported in Hackney and Dorset following problems with the electoral roll and distribution of cards for the incorrect polling station, blamed by officials on information technology and printing errors.

• Bournemouth council apologized after 100 people were unable to cast their vote in the local elections because an administrative blunder had led to the wrong ballot papers being issued. Earlier 250,000 ballot papers went missing after a printer’s van was stolen in Eastbourne and Hastings.

• The Electoral Commission investigated complaints that some overseas voters had not received their voting packs in time. The Guardian reported that Metropolitan police received 18 allegations of electoral fraud in the run up to polling day.

• In Tower Hamlets, the High Court suspended the Mayor, Lutfur Rahman, after he was found guilty of falsifying postal votes and putting undue pressure on voters at polling stations during the 2014 local and European elections.

• In Darlington, the BBC reported that the UKIP candidate’s name was missing on ballot papers.

• Finally, the Telegraph reported that the Scottish Tory party leader tweeted claims of voter intimidation in Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale, with the allegations investigated by local police.

None of these were major issues, compared with problems common in many other countries, but they may still have undermined public confidence in the electoral process. When asked beforehand in the British Election Study, the majority of citizens expected that the election would be conducted fairly, but almost one fifth (18%) thought that it would be unfairly conducted.

Comparative evidence of electoral integrity in the UK

But are media reports and political claims of fraud exaggerated? How does the quality of UK general elections compare with other established democracies – and indeed worldwide?

New evidence to give insights into this issue has been gathered by the Electoral Integrity Project. The 2015 annual report compares the risks of flawed and failed elections, and how far countries around the world meet international standards. The report gather assessments from over 2000 experts to evaluate the perceived integrity of all 180 national parliamentary and presidential contests held between 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2015 in 139 countries worldwide, including 54 national elections held last year. Forty experts are asked to assess each election, using 49 questions, with an average response rate of 30%. The overall 100-point Perceptions of Electoral Integrity index is constructed by summing the responses.

To summarize the evidence, Figure 1 illustrates the contrasts in the overall 100-point PEI index for all the countries covered in the survey since 2012, divided by global region.

Poor rating of UK elections compared with West European democracies

The results show that the May 2015 UK general election scored the worst of all West European states, ranking only 39 out of all 139 countries worldwide.

By contrast, Scandinavia is rated most highly in overall levels of electoral integrity, not surprisingly given the long history of democracy in the region. The rankings in PEI worldwide are led by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden – which also do well in most standard indices of the quality of democratic governance. The UK scores around 20 points less on the 100-point PEI Index than the top ranking Scandinavian states.

At the same time, however, contrasts are observed even among similar European Union member states and post-industrial societies; Mediterranean Europe usually performs less well than Northern Europe.

Worldwide the UK also performed less well than many newer democracies, such as Estonia, Lithuania, Uruguay and less well than comparable Anglo-American democracies like Canada, New Zealand and Australia, with the important exception of the United States.

Problems in UK elections

But what were the weakest stages? Contemporary debates have claimed that the problem is voter fraud. Yet Tony James and Alistair Clarke argue that in fact voter registration procedures are the greater problem, based on a survey of poll workers and electoral officials in local government. The UK results in PEI can be broken down in more detail to compare each of the eleven stages of the electoral cycle, in Figure 2. The results show that the UK was seen by experts to perform poorly on electoral laws, constituencies boundaries, and media coverage (especially fair and balanced newspaper reporting). By contrast, the voting, results and count stages (where fraud might emerge) are relatively positively rated by experts, lending support to the argument by James and Clark.

[Figure 2 about here]

Disproportional electoral laws

The poor marks given for the fairness of electoral laws is likely to tap into ongoing controversies about the electoral system. Despite considerable debate in recent decades over electoral reform, and many other systems in use within the UK, the electoral system for Westminster continues to use the plurality ‘First-past-the-Post’ system with 650 single member constituencies. Alan Renwick used three indices to demonstrate a consistently high level of disproportionality in UK general elections since 1974, when the Labour-Conservative two party system broke down, and the 2015 contest was no exception. In general, the UK Independence Party did particularly badly in its votes:seats share in this contest (with almost 4 million or 12.6% of the nationwide vote share and only one MP), as did the Liberal Democrats. By contrast, with just over 9 million votes, Labour racked up 232 MPs. In the global comparison, elections with majoritarian systems generally performed worse in PEI than those using PR.

 

Voter registration

Other current debates in the UK concern the procedures used for voter registration, although this was not highlighted as an issue of major concern by the PEI experts. The James-Clarke survey suggests that the electoral register needs attention: they found that over two thirds of polling stations turned away at least one citizen from voting in the 2015 election because their name was not on the electoral register.

 

The Conservative government has recently introduced individual voter register, replacing household registration, a reform justified by ministers as a more secure system guarding against alleged voter fraud. Nevertheless, critics charge that this may discourage participation by several sectors of the electorate, such as students and ethnic minorities. Last month, the Electoral Commission reported about 770,000 names had been removed from the register as the government introduced the requirement that people sign up as individuals rather than as households,  leading to Labour complaints about the risks of disenfranchisement.

Media coverage

The critique of unfair or imbalanced newspaper coverage in the PEI survey also reflects long-standing debates in British political communications.  Systematic evidence confirms this pattern continued in 2015.  Loughborough University produced the most thorough content analysis examining campaign coverage in ten major daily papers during the UK campaign.   The results suggest that according to ‘stopwatch balance’ (how many column inches were devoted to quotations from spokespersons in each party) there was a strong bias towards the Conservatives, with Labour coverage in second place. For example, 45% of all quotation space was given to Conservative spokespersons, compared with 30% for Labour and around 11% for the Lib Dems. The balance of positive/negative coverage was less pronounced except for a negative bias towards the SNP.

Therefore, the PEI results do suggest that there are familiar issues about the quality of elections which should concern the Electoral Commission.  The Westminster system is perceived by election experts to perform poorly compared with many equivalent Continental Europe and Scandinavian democracies. The problems highlighted may not be particularly surprising to long-standing observers of British elections.  But for Westminster to do worse than new democracies like Benin, Estonia, and Costa Rica suggests more deep-rooted cause for genuine concern.

Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at Harvard University, ARC Laureate and Professor of Government and IR at the University of Sydney, and Director of the Electoral Integrity Project. [email protected]

 

Fig 1: Global comparison of electoral integrity

Note: Scores on the 100-point Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index, where higher scores equals greater integrity

Source: Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI-4.0): www.electoralintegrityindex.com

Fig. 2: Perceived integrity in the 2015 UK general election

Note: Scores on the 100-point Perceptions of Electoral Integrity sub-indices, where higher scores equals greater integrity

Source: Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI-4.0): www.electoralintegrityindex.com

The depth of Ukrainian divisions between east and west?

Pippa Norris

Current events escalating in Crimea clearly highlight the polarization among political leaders and activists in Ukraine. Developments reflect conflicting visions of the country’s diplomatic ties and regional identities, whether as part of the future European Union or else linked to Russia and the legacy Commonwealth of Independent States.

But how much do the recent events reflect cultural cleavages among ordinary people living in Ukrainian society?

Cross-national survey evidence to examine Ukrainian public opinion is available from the World Values Survey. This study, which now includes more than 90 countries, is a global investigation of socio-cultural and political change. The survey started with the first wave in 1981 and the 6^th wave contains surveys from around 60 countries with data gathered from 2010-2014. The World Values Survey (WVS) is a non-profit, academic survey program representing the largest exploration into human values and cultural change around the world.

In 2011, during the period when President Viktor Yanukovych was in power for the Party of Regions, the 6^th wave study conducted a representative survey of 1,500 Ukrainians, almost equally divided by the language spoken at home into Russian and Ukrainian speakers.  For convenience these groups are labelled ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ Ukrainians. For comparison, the World Values Survey also conducted a similar survey of public opinion in the neighboring states of Poland (#966) in 2012 and Russia (#2,500) in 2011. The comparison allows us to see how far Eastern and Western Ukrainians share similar cultural values with each other on many issues, such as support for democracy or confidence in government, or whether they are closer to the values found in each neighboring state.

Attitudes towards democracy

First, do Ukrainians differ in their attitudes towards democracy? Are Western Ukrainians more enthusiastic for reforms strengthening political rights and civil liberties, while Eastern Ukrainians hanker for the strong state and stability of their authoritarian past?

 

One way to examine attitudes is through using a 0-10 point scale, where respondents were asked to assess the importance of living in a country which is democratic. Figure 1 illustrates the results showing that there are indeed some modest differences; Western Ukrainians rated the importance of democracy marginally higher than those living in the East. Western Ukrainians are therefore located a bit closer to political attitudes found in Poland, while Eastern Ukrainians express values which are slightly closer to Russian attitudes. But the gaps within Ukraine were extremely modest.

For another measure, people were also asked to use a similar 0-10 point scale to express their satisfaction with the performance of democracy in their own country. Here Ukrainians in both regions proved somewhat critical of how democracy worked in practice, fairly close to the opinions of most Russians, while by contrast Poles proved more satisfied with how democracy worked.

  Another way that political attitudes and values can be measured concerns public reactions to statements describing several alternative forms of rule.  Respondents were asked in the survey whether they thought it was good or bad to have a strong leader ‘who does not have to bother with parliaments or elections’, a way of tapping into approval of authoritarian rule without mentioning the ‘d’ word.

Here it appears from Figure 2 that Ukrainians overwhelmingly agree with the desire for strong leadership – and in this both Eastern and Western regions are strikingly similar to Russians.  Almost three quarters of Ukrainians and Russians approve of the idea of strong political leadership, perhaps expressing frustration with the process and outcome of elections. Only citizens in Poland display a stronger commitment to the principles and procedures of liberal democracy by strongly rejecting this form of rule.

Nevertheless public opinion is not wholly clear and consistent; when people were asked whether they approve of having a democratic political system, it appears that public opinion favors this form of government in all the societies under comparison. This pattern is also found elsewhere around the world, where the principles of democracy are widely endorsed, even among citizens living under one party states and authoritarian regimes.

Finally, what about trust and confidence in their government and parliament?  Here again there are some modest contrasts between Western and Eastern Ukrainians, following the expected direction. In 2011, those living in Eastern Ukraine expressed slightly more confidence and trust (+8% points) in the government of President Victor Yanukovych (Party of Regions) than those living in Western Ukraine. This reflects the map of votes cast in the January 17^th 2010 presidential contest. On the other hand, only around one fifth of Ukrainians expressed ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot of confidence’ in both their government and parliament, compared with far more Russian confidence in President Putin.

Conclusions

Overall what emerges are the striking cultural similarities rather than differences found in political values among the publics living in Eastern and Western Ukraine. On issues such as relatively strong endorsement of democratic values and ideals, and simultaneous lack of satisfaction with the way that democracy works, Ukrainians in both regions display the typical characteristics of ‘critical citizens’ found in many parts of the world (Norris 2011). Similarly  Ukrainians are not alone in the tensions observed between those seeking strong leaders and yet also approving of democracy. And the low confidence in core political institutions is also far from unique to this country.

Admittedly there are some small but important contrasts between Western and Eastern Ukrainians, notably in voting support for the Party of the Regions and in confidence in the government of President Yanukovych. Other explorations of the data suggest that indeed Eastern Ukrainians have more confidence in CIS than those living in the East. But the political attitudes which are shared among all Ukrainians are far more evident from this comparison than the values which differ. Not surprisingly, although language divides, there are many other aspects of Ukrainian culture and historical traditions which have been shared over the centuries. Even if the leaders and activists are sharply divided, this evidence suggest that the cultural differences within Ukraine remains fairly modest.

Reference:

Norris, Pippa. 2011. Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited New York: Cambridge University Press. 

New problems of electoral integrity

Claims of voter fraud and voter suppression in US elections. Robo-call scandals in Canada. Allegations of vote-buying in Mexican contests. Ballot-stuffing in Armenia. Heavy-handed suppression of human rights in Iranian contests.

What do all these problems have in common?

On June 3-4th 2013, over seventy leading international scholars and practitioners met at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University to discuss electoral integrity. More than thirty papers presented new research investigating the causes and consequences of problems of electoral integrity. 

Organized by the Electoral Integrity Project, the workshop debated issues as diverse as public trust and confidence in elections in the United States, Latin America, and sub-Saharen Africa, the performance of Electoral Management Bodies in the UK, Central America and Sudan, and new techniques for detecting voter fraud in Ghana, the US and Afghanistan. All papers are available at www.electoralintegrityproject.com.

The workshop concluded with a panel discussing the next steps in the research agenda which would be most useful for the international community. The panel included representatives from the Carter Center, IFES, the Organization of American States,  the United Nations Development Programme, Democracy International and international IDEA. 

Overall the workshop strengthened the networks of scholars and practitioners focused on these challenges and laid the outlines for the next generation of research strengthening electoral integrity. The subsequent workshop to develop this program will meet in Chicago on 28 August 2013 in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

When do elections fail (and succeed)?

Pippa Norris, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martinez I Coma (Electoral Integrity Project)

In recent years, far too many elections have ended with the major protagonists at loggerheads, parties bitterly disputing the results, and conflict spilling over onto the streets. Cries of fraud are common, especially among losers in tight winner-take-all presidential races.

    When questions about the legitimacy of the outcome arises, is there reliable evidence that contests fail to meet international standards? Or are these simply sour grape attempts to undermine the rightful winners?

    To provide a more systematic, credible, reliable and legitimate source of independent evidence, in early-2013 the Electoral Integrity Project launched a new pilot study seeking to provide an authoritative assessment of the quality of national elections held around the world. The Electoral Integrity Project is developed by a team of scholars at the University of Sydney and Harvard University, led by Professor Pippa Norris, in conjunction with an international advisory board, the International Political Science Association, and many partner organizations in the international community.

    For the pilot study on electoral integrity, conducted in April-May 2013, the project focused upon twenty independent nation-states around the world which had held national presidential or parliamentary elections during the prior six months, (i.e. the period from 1 July to 31 December 2012). 

All the data can be downloaded from www.electoralintegrityproject.com.

    For each country, the project identified around forty election experts, defined as a political scientist (or other social scientist in a related discipline) who had demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process in a particular country. The selection sought a roughly 50:50 balance between international and domestic experts, the latter defined by location or citizenship. Experts were asked to complete an online survey. In total, 226 completed responses were received in the pilot study, representing just under one third of the experts that the project contacted (30%).

    The idea of electoral integrity is defined by the project to refer to agreed international conventions and global norms, applying universally to all countries worldwide through the election cycle, including during the pre-election period, the campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath. The concept is seen as having eleven sub-dimensions in a sequential cycle.

    The survey results are discussed in detail elsewhere but for a quick snapshot, here are the overall rankings in the countries under comparison.

Overall the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and South Korea came top of the rankings, all countries which have had a series of recent elections which are regarded as by observers and media commentators as without major flaws. By contrast, Belarus, the Republic of Congo, Angola, and Ukraine are all seen as performing poorly in elections, an assessment which is also consistent with observer reports.

    Interestingly, the United States ranks 7^th in the countries under comparison, similar to Mexico and slightly below several newer democracies. Thus one finding emerging from the pilot study is that greater experience of democratic elections in any society was not necessarily an accurate predictor of the perceived quality of contemporary elections.

    But what were seen as the key factors driving these results? Over-simple ‘pass-fail’ judgments are of little use to reformers seeking to strengthen the process.

    Table 1 below presents the more fine-grained assessments concerning the performance of each of the eleven sub-dimensions in the electoral cycle. To summarize the comparisons across each of the 100-point standardized scales, using the familiar traffic light symbols, mean assessments below 49 were categorized as ‘low’ in integrity (colored red), and those from 50 to 74 were categorized as ‘moderate’ (colored orange), while scores over 75 were categorized as ‘high’ (colored green).

    The analysis shows that issues of campaign finance were regarded as most problematic across many countries, with more than half the elections seen as performing poorly. Similarly campaign coverage by the news media was highlighted by experts as another area of concern.

The results also highlight specific problems occurring in particular countries, notably the partisan and decentralized nature of gerrymandering district boundaries in the United States (an area where the US achieved its lowest score), problems of the voting process in Venezuela, and challenges of fair and equitable media coverage and campaign finance in Romania. 

    Thus overall the PEI index and dimensional scores help to highlight particular problems in each country which experts suggest deserve special attention by domestic stakeholders and the international community. Where flaws are identified, the next steps in the research are to establish their precise causes, their consequences, and what can be learnt from best practice to remedy the situation in the next contest.

    Source: Pippa Norris, Ferran Martínez i Coma and Richard W. Frank. 2013. The Expert Survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, Pilot Study April 2013:www.electoralintegrityproject.com

Beta testing new expert survey: Perceptions of electoral integrity

We are in the process of developing a new survey monitoring expert Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) and we need your help!

The survey plans to contact c.40 experts immediately after each national election (constituent assembly, presidential or parliamentary) to gather views about these contests. Experts will be drawn from many different fields, such as scholars, lawyers, election officials and journalists familiar with elections. We will seek a balance of local residents and international experts and we will aim to achieve c.25 replies per country, working with international agencies and regional networks to identify email contacts for suitable experts. The survey is planned to be repeated after each national contest. The aggregate results for each country will be published via the project website, broken down by question category, as well as through a standardized index measuring Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. National coverage is planned to be global. Over time, as results accumulate, we hope that this will generate valuable information for the research and policy-making communities.

It would be greatly appreciated if colleagues could look briefly at the beta testing version of the survey and if you could send us comments.

https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/data-1/expert-survey

Colleagues may want to try completing the survey, to see if it works for the last election held in each country, or alternatively just send any criticisms, feedback, and ideas to [email protected] . Either way, we would greatly appreciate hearing your advice, no matter how critical. We want to develop the right instrument. Opportunities to comment on the beta testing process will close by 1st October 2012. The survey fieldwork will start in January 2013 and the preliminary results will be evaluated at the Electoral Integrity Project’s next annual workshop, to be held at Harvard 3-4th June 2012.

We look forward to hearing from you.

In addition, several new draft papers are also now available for comment via the website www.electoralintegrityproject.com

Pippa Norris (Harvard University and the University of Sydney), Andrew Reynolds (University of North Carolina) and Jorgen Elklit (Aarhus University)

Muslim integration into Western cultures

In 2005, the International Organization for Migration estimates that among all world regions, Europe hosted the highest number of international migrants (70.5 million). At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the OECD estimates that about one in four or five residents were foreign-born in countries such as Australia (24%), Switzerland (24%), New Zealand (19%), and Canada (18%), as were one in eight in Germany (13%), the United States (13%), and Sweden (12%) OECD 2008).  Due to these developments, European countries which used to be relatively homogeneous in their cultural heritage, historical traditions, ethnic composition, language, lifestyles, and religious faith -- such as Denmark, France, and Sweden -- have become far more socially diverse today

Population flows are diverse. The rapid settlement of Muslim migrants into European societies, in particular, has raised important challenges for how European policymakers manage cultural diversity, maintain social cohesion, and accommodate minorities. This is one of the main reasons for the contemporary strength of anti-immigrant parties, as demonstrated by Marie Le Pen winning 18 percent of the vote for the Front Nationale in the first round of the French presidential elections, on a platform denouncing "Islamification.” The backlash against migration has shaped party politics in many European nations, in countries as diverse as the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway and Sweden. More broadly, concern over Muslim migrants has been heightened by a series of extreme terrorist events attracting global headlines, particularly by 9/11 in the United States, the bombings directed against civilian targets in Madrid (2004), London (2005), and Mumbai (2008).

These events highlight the importance of understanding the process of assimilation, and in particular, how far do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new setting? Answers to these questions not only have important political implications; they also help us understand theoretical debates about whether basic cultural values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or attributes of a given society.  Theories of cultural integration suggest that immigrants gradually absorb the values and norms which predominate in their host society, especially on an inter-generational basis. By contrast, theories of divergence suggest that distinctive social values and norms are enduring and deep-rooted within each nation, shaped by collective histories, common languages, and religious traditions, so that migrant populations are unlikely to abandon their cultural roots when they settle in another country. These claims can be tested empirically by examining whether the basic values of Muslim migrants are closer to those prevailing in their societies of origin or destination.

Evidence can be compared using evidence the five pooled waves of the World Values Survey and European Values Study, a global investigation of socio-cultural and political change from 1981 to 2007. The survey includes systematic data on public opinion in affluent post-industrial societies and in many diverse Islamic states containing Muslim-plurality populations, providing the broadest comparison available from any existing social survey. Societies in the World Values Survey can be classified by their predominant religion. The World Values Survey includes Arab states, both majority Sunni (such as Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt) and majority Shi’a (such as Iran and Iraq), as well as countries in Asia (Azerbaijan, Kyrgystan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia), Central Europe (Bosnia Herzegovina, Albania) and in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso). This allows us to compare the attitudes of three groups: Muslims living in Muslim-predominant societies (termed Societies of Origin), Westerners living in Western societies (termed Societies of Destination), and Muslim migrants living in Western societies.

A series of 13 items were selected and developed into standardized 0 to 100-point scales to monitor cultural values towards gender equality, sexuality, religiosity, and democratic values. Comparisons were drawn among these three social groups, as shown in figure 1. It is apparent that Muslim migrants are consistently located on average in the middle of the value scales, being less conservative than Muslims living in Muslim Societies of Origin, but also less liberal than Westerners living in Western societies. In other words, the position of Muslim migrants proved to be located approximately half-way between the dominant values prevailing within their Destination and their Origins. It is also striking that although much of the European debate has focused on the attitudes and practices towards the roles of men and women, it appears that on the gender equality scale, Muslim minorities are in fact far closer to Western than to Islamic publics.

 

When analyzing the evidence, however, several controls need to be introduced for factors which typically influence social attitudes, such as education, age and sex. After all, Muslim migrants may well prove distinctive from their compatriots for many reasons; for example, younger groups, and those with greater educational qualifications or higher socioeconomic resources, may well find it easier to relocate. Hierarchical linear models (HLM) are most appropriate for this sort of analysis, including multilevel regression analysis. The results confirm that Muslim migrants living in Western societies are located roughly in the center of the cultural spectrum, located between the publics living in Islamic and Western societies. It is entirely possible—indeed, we think it rather likely—that some degree of self-selection may be involved:  those who choose to immigrate to the U.S. or to Spain may already have values that are relatively compatible with those of their future host country.  But even if this is true, these findings contradict the idea that immigrants simply import an unmodified version of the values of their own country into their new host country.  In the long-term, the basic cultural values of migrants appear to change in conformity with the predominant culture of each society. 

Details are forthcoming in Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2012. “Muslim integration into Western cultures: Between Origins and Destimations.” Political Studies 

Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and also ARC Fellow and Professor of Government at the University of Sydney. [email protected]

Ronald Inglehart is Professor of Political Science in the Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan and also Director, Laboratory for Comparative Social Research, Higher School of Economics Moscow and St. Petersburg. [email protected]

UK British general election 6th May 2010: Summary of results

UK General Election 6^th May 2010

 

 

 

The following provides a brief summary of the results of the UK general election held on 6th May 2010. Access to the 2010 constituency results data in Excel and PASW/SPSS formats is now available for downloading from my website wwwpippanorris.com under 'data'.

 

Contents

 

Table 1: UK scoreboard    2

Table 2: % Share of the popular vote (UK)    3

Figure 1: % Share of the popular vote (UK)    4

Table 3: % Share of seats (UK)    5

Figure 2: % Share of seats (UK) 1900-2010    6

Figure 3: Government Votes: Seats Ratio 1945-2010    7

Table 4: Government overall majority, 1900-2010    8

Figure 4: UK Electoral Turnout 1832-2010    9

Figure 5: Electoral system effects    10

Figure 6: May 6^th 2010 UK Election map    11

 

 

Table 1: UK scoreboard

Party	Seats	Gain	Loss	Net	Votes	%	+/-%
Conservative	306	100	3	+97	10,706,647	36.1	+3.8
Labour	258	3	94	-91	8,604,358	29.0	-6.2
Liberal Democrat	57	8	13	-5	6,827,938	23.0	+1.0
Democratic Unionist Party	8	0	1	-1	168,216	0.6	-0.3
Scottish National Party	6	0	0	0	491,386	1.7	+0.1
Sinn Fein	5	0	0	0	171,942	0.6	-0.1
Plaid Cymru	3	1	0	+1	165,394	0.6	-0.1
Social Democratic & Labour Party	3	0	0	0	110,970	0.4	-0.1
Green	1	1	0	+1	285,616	1.0	-0.1
Alliance Party	1	1	0	+1	42,762	0.1	+0.0
UK Independence Party	0	0	0	0	917,832	3.1	+0.9
British National Party	0	0	0	0	563,743	1.9	+1.2
Ulster Conservatives and Unionists - New Force	0	0	1	-1	102,361	0.3	-0.1
English Democrats	0	0	0	0	64,826	0.2	+0.2
Respect-Unity Coalition	0	0	1	-1	33,251	0.1	-0.1
Traditional Unionist Voice	0	0	0	0	26,300	0.1
Christian Party	0	0	0	0	18,623	0.1
Independent Community and Health Concern	0	0	1	-1	16,150	0.1	+0.0
Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition	0	0	0	0	12,275	0.0
Scottish Socialist Party	0	0	0	0	3,157	0.0	-0.1
Others	1	1	1	0	319,891	1.1	0.0
Turnout					29,653,638	65.1	4.0

Note: After 649 of 650 seats declared.

Source: news.BBC.co.uk

 

Table 2: % Share of the popular vote (UK)

	Con	Lab	LD	Other
1900	50.3	1.3	45.0	2.5
1906	43.4	4.8	49.4
1910	46.8	7.0	43.5
1910	46.6	6.4	44.2
1918	38.7	20.8	25.6
1922	38.5	29.7	28.8
1923	38.0	30.7	29.7
1924	46.8	33.3	17.8
1929	38.1	37.1	23.5
1931	60.7	30.9	7.0
1935	53.3	38.0	6.7
1945	39.6	48.0	9.0	2.6
1950	43.4	46.1	9.1	1.0
1951	48.0	48.8	2.6	0.3
1955	49.7	46.4	2.7	0.7
1959	49.4	43.8	5.9	0.7
1964	43.4	44.1	11.2	0.9
1966	41.9	48.0	8.6	1.3
1970	46.4	43.1	7.5	2.3
1974	37.9	37.2	19.3	3.5
1974	35.8	39.2	18.3	4.4
1979	43.9	36.9	13.8	3.3
1983	42.4	27.6	25.4	2.2
1987	42.3	30.8	22.5	2.2
1992	41.9	34.4	17.8	3.7
1997	30.7	43.3	16.8	7.1
2001	31.7	40.7	18.3	9.3
2005	32.3	35.2	22.0	10.5
2010	36.1	29.0	23.0	11.9
Change 2005-10	+3.8	-6.2	+1.0	+1.4

Source: Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. British Electoral Facts 1832-1999 Ashgate; updated

Figure 1: % Share of the popular vote (UK)

Source: Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. British Electoral Facts 1832-1999 Ashgate; updated.

Table 3: % Share of seats (UK)

	Con	Lab	LD	Other	Total
1900	402	2	183	83	670
1906	156	29	399	86	670
1910	272	40	274	84	670
1910	271	42	272	85	670
1918	382	57	163	105	707
1922	344	142	115	14	615
1923	258	191	158	8	615
1924	412	151	40	12	615
1929	260	287	59	9	615
1931	522	52	36	5	615
1935	429	154	21	11	615
1945	210	393	12	25	640
1950	298	315	9	3	625
1951	321	295	6	3	625
1955	345	277	6	2	630
1959	365	258	6	1	630
1964	304	317	9	0	630
1966	253	364	12	1	630
1970	330	288	6	6	630
1974	297	301	14	23	635
1974	277	319	13	26	635
1979	339	269	11	16	635
1983	397	209	23	21	650
1987	376	229	22	23	650
1992	336	271	20	24	651
1997	165	418	46	30	659
2001	166	412	52	29	659
2005	197	355	62	32	646
2010	306	258	57	28	649
Change	97	-91	-5	-4

Source: Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. British Electoral Facts 1832-1999 Ashgate; updated.

 

Figure 2: % Share of seats (UK) 1900-2010

 

 

Source: Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. British Electoral Facts 1832-1999 Ashgate; updated.

 

Figure 3: Government Votes: Seats Ratio 1945-2010

 

 

Note: Calculated by % votes/% seats for the governing party. 2010 is estimated based on the assumption of a Conservative government

Table 4: Government overall majority, 1900-2010

	Overall Maj	Govnt
1900	135	Con	Salisbury/Balfour
1906	129	Lib	Campbell Bannerman
1910		None	Asquith
1910		None	Asquith
1918	283	Coalition	Lloyd George
1922	74	Con	Bonar Law
1923		None	Baldwin
1924	210	Con	MacDonald
1929		None	MacDonald
1931	492	Nat	MacDonald
1935	242	Nat	Baldwin/Chamberlain/Churchill
1945	147	Lab	Attlee
1950	6	Lab	Attlee
1951	16	Con	Churchill
1955	59	Con	Eden/Macmillan
1959	99	Con	Macmillan/Douglas-Home
1964	5	Lab	Wilson
1966	97	Lab	Wilson
1970	31	Con	Heath
1974	0	Lab	Wilson
1974	4	Lab	Wilson/Callaghan
1979	44	Con	Thatcher
1983	144	Con	Thatcher
1987	101	Con	Thatcher
1992	21	Con	Major
1997	178	Lab	Blair
2001	167	Lab	Blair
2005	66	Lab	Blair/Brown
2010		None	Cameron?

 

Source: Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. British Electoral Facts 1832-1999 Ashgate; updated.

Figure 4: UK Electoral Turnout 1832-2010

Source: Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. British Electoral Facts 1832-1999 Ashgate; updated.

 

Figure 5: Electoral system effects

 

	Con	Lab	LD	Other
FPTP	306	258	57	28
STV	246	207	162	35
AV	281	262	79	28
PR List	234	188	150	78

 

Note: Estimated number of seats seats under the 6^th May 2010 share of vote, assuming no change in the distribution of votes and no legal electoral threshold.

Source: Estimates for AV and STV (with 3-5 MPs). Electoral Reform Society. May 10^th 2010. "STV & the parliament that might have been.."

http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/news.php?ex=0&nid=469

Figure 6: May 6^th 2010 UK Election map