Pippa Norris's Weblog

Trust in democracy

Over the weekend, I attended a conference in The Hague on the issue of an erosion of trust in European democracies, especially focused on the situation in the Netherlands. The meeting was organized by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior, the Council for Public Administration, and NOW, the Netherlands Council for Scientific Research.

Much of the discussion centered around the perceived disaffection with democracy, and concern about an erosion of trust in government and in democratic institutions, including parties and parliament. Both academics and politicians emphasized that the Netherlands was experiencing a crisis of consocationalism, where the core values of tolerance, accommodation, and consensus, a source of deep national pride, were under growing threat. Many speakers thought that changes in the news media had contributed towards any growth in public cynicism and intolerance, alongside the 'personalization' of politics and the weakness of parties.

But the empirical evidence supporting the idea that political trust and satisfaction with democracy has steadily eroded, whether in Europe or the Netherlands, is by no means clear-cut. The following illustrates trends in satisfaction with democracy across a dozen European nations, as monitored by the Eurobarometer surveys from the early-1970s. The comparison covers a range of older democracies, as well as a few younger cases (Spain, Portugal and Greece). It also includes regimes with power-concentrating (majoritarian) institutions (such as France and the UK), as well as others with power-sharing (consensus) structures (such as Belgium and the Netherlands).

The overall results suggest a pattern of trendless fluctuations, rather than steady secular erosion in satisfaction. Indeed many countries such as Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark show rising satisfaction across the period, while other cases display peaks and troughs, suggesting volatility, especially among younger democracies. The contrasts in levels of satisfaction among countries are also apparent, notably persistently low satisfaction in Italy, especially in contrast with the Netherlands. But there is no evidence here that power-sharing democracies have consistently experienced falling public satisfaction – or that there are any steady trends across European democracies. Similar Eurobarometer trends comparing trust in institutions also show a pattern of trendless fluctuations more than steady decline.

Table 1: Satisfaction with democracy, EU12 1972-2007

Source: Eurobarometer

So why were so many speakers at the conference convinced that a 'crisis' of public trust was apparent in the Netherlands?

In part, the explanation rests on the recent political history of the country, suggesting an era of growing party instability and polarization (Mair 2008). New issue cleavages, notably immigration and the rise of a more multicultural society, have generated strains challenging the old party politics of consensus accommodation. Moreover these developments have been exacerbated by the Dutch electoral system, a national party list system with an exceptionally low threshold of votes for parties to enter electoral office.

Following the 1994 general election, the 'Purple' Coalition was formed among PvdA (Labour), D66 (progressive liberal) and VVD (conservative liberal). During this era, the government introduced legislation on abortion, euthanasia and gay marriage. The coalition parties lost their majority in the 2002 earthquake elections, due to the rise of List Pim Fortuyn, the new political party led by the flamboyant populist Pim Fortuyn, campaigning on an anti-immigration programme. The assassination of Fortuyn a week before polling day boosted his party's support; the LPF entered parliament with one sixth of the seats, while the PvdA (Labour) lost half its seats. A cabinet was formed by CDA, VVD and LPF, led by Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, but after only 87 days in power, the coalition fell apart as a result of consecutive conflicts within the LPF and between LPF ministers.

In the ensuing elections in January 2003, the LPF dropped to only five percent of the seats in the Second Chamber. The left-wing Socialist Party (SP) became the fourth party of the Netherlands. The centre-right Balkenende II cabinet was formed by the Christian-Democratic CDA, the conservative-liberal VVD and the progressive-liberal D66. Against popular sentiment, the right-wing coalition initiated an ambitious programme of welfare state reforms, health care privatization, and stricter immigration policies. On June 1, 2005, the Dutch electorate voted in a referendum against the proposed European Constitution by a majority of 62%, three days after the French had also rejected the treaty.

In June 2006, D66 withdrew its support for the coalition, triggering its collapse, and the Balkenende III caretaker cabinet was formed by CDA and VVD. The ensuing general elections held on 22 November 2006 saw a landslide victory for the Socialist Party, which almost tripled in size and became the third largest party with 17% of the seats, while the moderate PvdA (Labour) lost a quarter of its seats. At the other end of the spectrum, LPF lost all its seats, while the new anti-immigrant PVV went from nothing to 6% of the seats, becoming the fifth biggest party. This polarisation of the Second Chamber, with an even distribution between left and right, made the cabinet formation negotiations very difficult. The talks eventually resulted in the formation of the Social-Christian fourth cabinet Balkenende, by the PvdA, the CDA and the Christian Union.

The result has been new challenges arising to the stability of Dutch coalition governments. A country which has long prided itself on a culture of liberal tolerance, founded on elite accommodation in a consociational democracy, finds itself under growing difficulty in meeting these ideals.

These are indeed important developments but it is not clear that these elite-level challenges are necessarily reflected in long-term shifts in public attitudes towards Dutch democratic institutions, nor that changes in the news media (such as personalization and commercialization) or in campaign communications (such as any growth in 'negative' messages) have played a major role in these events. New issue cleavages, and the role of the radical right in exploiting these developments, is certainly an important phenomenon, but this has affected majoritarian political systems (such as support for LePen's Front National in France) as well as consociational or power-sharing systems (as exemplified by support for the radical right parties in Austria and Belgium). It remains to be seen whether the polarization of Dutch party politics persists, deepens (under the current economic climate), or possibly reduces, if bread-and-butter concerns with economic management return to the top of the political agenda

Reference for further information:

Mark Bovens & Anchrit Wille. 2008. Deciphering the Dutch drop: ten explanations for decreasing political trust in The Netherlands, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74: 283-305.

Peter Mair. 2008. 'Electoral Volatility and the Dutch Party System: A Comparative Perspective.' Acta Politica, 4 (2-3):235-253

The Success of Democracy in Ghana

Yesterday citizens in Ghana flocked to the polls for the second round of elections. The first round of simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections held in Ghana on 7^th December 2008 was closely fought between the major parties. The contest was largely peaceful, free and fair. Parties mobilized supporters through party rallies and local canvassing, with news coverage reflecting diverse views and perspectives. Competition in the presidential and parliamentary contests was intense, especially between the two major parties. Both sides claimed some electoral irregularities occurred, especially in the second round of the presidential contest, but the first round was peaceful. After the first round, the EU Election Observation Mission reported that the elections met all international standards. Elections were conducted in an 'open, transparent and competitive environment' respecting the right to stand for election and to vote, with widespread freedoms of assembly, expression and movement. The outcome was even more remarkable on a continent where fragile democratic transitions have often collapsed with sudden reversals.

Experiments with democracy in Africa have failed for many reasons; presidents fail to respect term limits, minor electoral irregularities in close contests (such as in Kenya) can trigger sudden tensions and violent street protests, and the existence of predominant parties (such as in mean that peaceful rotations of power from the government to opposition parties are relatively infrequent.

How did the Kenyan election a year earlier trigger such a violent outcome while, by contrast, the first round of the Ghanaian contest was widely recognized by observers at home and abroad as meeting the international standards for a democratic election? And, even more importantly, what are the broader implications of the marked contrasts between these particular contests for understanding the not-so-simple relationship between elections and democratic governance?

Ghanaian democracy

A half-century ago, Ghana was the first African state to achieve independence following colonial rule. In 1966 its first president and pan-African hero, Kwame Nkrumah, was deposed in a coup, heralding years of mostly-military rule. In 1981 Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings staged his second coup. The country began to move towards economic stability and democracy. In April 1992 a constitution allowing for a multi-party system was approved in a referendum, ushering in a sustained period of democracy. Since then, Ghana has experienced periodic multiparty contests which international observers have regarded as free and fair. The constitution specified that presidential elections are held using the 2^nd ballot majoritarian system, while the 230 parliamentary members are elected for a four year term in single member constituencies using a first-past-the-post election system. The two largest political parties that dominate contemporary politics in Ghana, the liberal democratic New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the social democratic National Democratic Congress (NDC), have both enjoyed two consecutive terms in presidential office and majorities in parliament, the NDC from 1992-2000 and the NPP from 2000-2008. In December 2000, John Kufuor was elected as president, succeeding Jerry Rawlings in a peaceful transition of power. Re-elected in 2004, President Kufuour stepped down voluntarily four years later, observing the constitutional two-term limit.

First round contests on 7 December 2008

In the run up to December 7 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections, parties campaigned freely across the country, on policy driven issues such as social welfare and the economy and they published comprehensive manifestos. The campaign environment was lively and the parties canvassed voters door-to-door, holding a series of peaceful local rallies and town-hall meetings across Ghana, with the presidential candidates of the NPP and NDC touring the country. A series of independent polls were published in the media. Debates between the presidential candidates of the four parties with parliamentary representation were broadcast live via the major media outlets. Public and private sector broadcasting channels offered extensive news reporting about the campaign, especially coverage of the major parties and presidential candidates, and a large number of discussion programs. Newspapers provided a diverse range of views and covered all of the major events organized by the parties during the campaign, although as was the case with broadcasters, they focused their coverage on the larger political parties. There were also many paid political advertisements in the media and at times these were used to openly criticize opposing parties. The absence of any legal campaign spending limits meant that political parties were free to use unlimited resources. Both the NDC and NPP organized highly developed campaign strategies.

In the first round of the presidential contest, the governing party candidate was Nana Akufo-Addo, one of the founding members of the New Patriotic Party when multi-party democracy returned to Ghana, and an advocate of human rights. He faced the opposition candidate, Professor John Atta Mills, a social democrat heading the National Democratic Congress party, and six other minor party candidates who also threw their hat into the ring. The first round election among all contestants ended on a knife-edge; the popular vote was evenly divided between Akufo-Addo (49.1%) and Atta Mills (47.9%), with scattered support for others. As no single candidate gained an absolute majority, the outcome was decided by the second round contest between the two leading candidates. This round saw an extremely close contest where Atta Mills won a slender lead over the governing party's Akufo-Addo.

The parliamentary elections held on 7^th December, held under plurality single member rules, proved equally competitive. The result saw the governing New Patriotic Party fall to 107 parliamentary seats with 49% of the popular vote. It was overtaken in a tight race by the opposition National Democratic Congress, gaining 114 seats, with a more efficient distribution of support as it won only 47% of the national popular vote. Two minor parties and four independents were also returned as members of parliament.

The European Union was among a host of institutions observing these contests, including the Carter Centre, ECOWAS, African Union, and over 4000 representatives from the Coalition of Domestic Observers (CODEO). The EU reported that the Electoral Commission who administered the contests proved impartial, professional, and independent, ensuring the transparency of the process. Electoral observers and party agents were able to observe all stages of polling, vote counting, and aggregation. There were clear legal channels for complaints and appeals challenging the results and the Commission worked to ensure conciliation and acceptance of the process among the major stakeholders. There were some minor administrative irregularities experienced on polling day during the first round, but the Electoral Commission apologized for these and sought to rectify the situation. A series of public forum, organized by the National Peace Council (NPC), brought together all major stakeholders and parties to discuss the polling process, to diffuse any discontent, and to offer recommendations for future contests.

The second round presidential contest on 28^th December 2008

With the election count now underway, the outcome of the second round is currently unknown. If the second round contests are resolved in a peaceful and orderly manner, the outcome will be all the more remarkable because Ghana lacks many of the social and economic conditions which are commonly associated with stable democracies. An ethically-divided society, by languages and religions, there are estimated to be more than 100 distinct groups, including the Akan, Ewe, Mole-Dagbane, Guan, and Ga-Adangbe. Ghana is also one of the poorest countries in the world, with an average per capita GDP of $1,400. One third of the population live below $1.25 a day. Francophone West Africa is one of the poorest and most unstable regions of the world; autocracies in Mauritania, Chad, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic coexist with fragile states engaged in peace-building after protracted conflict, including Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. Within a few days of Ghanaians going to the polls, in Guinea the death of a dictator triggered a chaotic military coup.

Yet overall the first round of the Ghanaian elections was judged by domestic and international observers to be a considerable success, another largely-orderly and peaceful contest further consolidating Ghana's successive steps towards stable democracy. In 2008, Freedom House rated Ghana 1.5 on its 7-point index of political rights and civil liberties, comparable to Greece, Israel, South Korea, and Bulgaria. We currently await the outcome of the final contest but so far the election represents a beacon of hope for democracy in a region noted by a checkered history for political stability and human rights.

Loss of Samuel P. Huntington

Yesterday it was announced that Harvard political scientist, Professor Samuel P. Huntington, had died on Martha's Vineyard on Christmas Eve. He was 81. 

This was a great loss to political science. He is probably best known in the world at large for his controversial work in the clash of civilizations, first published in a 1993 article in the journal Foreign Affairs and then expanded the thesis into a book, “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,” published in 1996. But this represents only the tip of the iceberg for this prolific and controversial scholar who had devoted a lifetime to studying a diverse range of topics on American politics, the causes of political stability, processes of democratization, foreign affairs and international relations, and religiosity.

In political science, he was one of the great figures with big ideas who sparked debate and generated controversy. I disagreed profoundly with many of his ideas, as do my students, but it was always fruitful to explore arguments about the larger questions which illuminate the discipline. In particular it is worth highlighting the seminal contributions he made in his 1969 book Political Order in Changing Societies, which analyzed political and economic development in the third world. He also was co-author of The Crisis of Democracy: On the Governability of Democracies, a report issued by the Trilateral Commission in 1976. This influential report predicted political instability in established democracies, arising from the outbreak of street protests and the rise of new social movements challenging authorities. In 1991 he published The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, to account for cyclical patterns of democracy and for the new regimes emerging following the fall of the Berlin Wall. His most recent book focused on immigration, including Who we Are: The Challenges to American National Identity, published in 2004. He was continuing to teach and work on a large project comparing religiosity worldwide at the time of his death.

Always a sharp observer of contemporary developments, blending concern about topical issues with large ideas in the social sciences, he will be sadly missed by colleagues and friends. Even though many of his claims and arguments were not one's with which I sympathized, political science will be poorer for his loss, as we badly need more scholars with his breadth and vision.